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ABSTRACT
In Gonzales v. Raich, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the
federal Controlled Substances Act to bar the use of state-grown marijuana for instate personal medical use. In so doing, the Court ratified the expansion of Congress’
commerce power beyond any known limits. It abandoned the “substantial effects”
test that it had used since 1937 and applied the “rational basis” test. This Article
traces the historical development of Congress’ enumerated powers from the earliest
cases, emphasizing the expansive view of commerce power found in Gibbons v.
Ogden. From that strong beginning for the commerce power, the Article follows the
various detours of the United States Supreme Court cases, some cases imposing now
rejected limits on the commerce power, some setting the foundation for the modern
test. The main thrust of the Article is to argue that both in terms of history and in
terms of our federalist form of government that Congress’ commerce power in
instances not involving the actual crossing of state lines should be limited to local
activities that in a practical fact-based way have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. The Article asserts that the rational basis test should have no role to play
in determining Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, that the rational
basis test is not only historically unsupportable, but that it also represents a failure of
the Court to play its appropriate role in protecting “Our Federalism.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a
modest one. We need not determine whether
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.1
In Gonzales v. Raich,2 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to bar the use of
state-grown marijuana for in-state personal medical use. In so doing,
the Court ratified the expansion of Congress’ commerce power beyond
any known limits. It abandoned the “substantial effects” test that it had
used since 1937 3 and applied the “rational basis” test. 4 Make no
mistake about it, the substantial effects test is the correct test based
upon both Supreme Court precedents and the constitutional division of
power in our federalist system between the federal government and the
1
2
3

4

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
Id.
See, for example, N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937), where the Court used the “substantial effects test.” In Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court stated that, “Although activities may be intrastate in character
when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power
to exercise that control.” Id. (emphasis added).
The rational basis test is primarily a minimum level of scrutiny used in
substantive due process and equal protection cases not involving fundamental
rights or suspect classifications. See e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.” (emphasis added)). But the
rational basis test did morph into some Commerce Clause cases. See e.g.,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (“But where we find that
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have
a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.” (emphasis added)). In
McClung, the Court upheld Congress’ commerce power under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to regulate private racism impacting the interstate shipment of food
supplies to an in-state restaurant. Id.

2019

The Commerce Clause

185

states. The rational basis test is fundamentally inconsistent with our
federalist system of government.
The opening quote from Justice Steven’s opinion in Raich has at
least three substantive errors. First, the task for the Court in reviewing
federal enumerated power is far from a “modest one.”5 Determining
the limits on federal power is one of the Court’s most important jobs.
Our federalist system of government dividing power between the
central government and our fifty states requires that the Court enforce
the limits on federal power.
Second, in terms of Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce, the Court’s job is specifically to look at the aggregate
impact of local activity to determine if activity strictly within one state
has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. 6 The substantial
effects test imposes judicially enforceable limits on federal power over
local activity strictly in one state. The substantial effects test requires a
substantial connection between a federal law and some impact on
interstate commerce and thus imposes limited but specific restrictions
on Congress’ enumerated power.7 It is a practical fact-based inquiry
and has the support of history, precedent, and common sense on its
side.
Third, the rational basis test is a venerable test for due process and
equal protection issues, but despite some precedential support, its use
in determining the scope of federal enumerated commerce power is
inconsistent with constitutional limits on federal power. The rational
5

6

7

As Chief Justice Marshall famously said about the scope of federal power, “But
the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted,
is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system
shall exist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the general
and state governments must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their
respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be settled.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
See the Court’s approach in Wickard v. Filburn, “But even if appellee’s activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce . . . .” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Later
the Court continued, “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Id. at 127–28.
As the Court said in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, “We have often said
that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that
interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not
ignore actual experience.” Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41–42.
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basis test for determining enumerated powers essentially allows
Congress to define its own powers and is virtually without identifiable
limits; it is little more than a judicial rubber stamp on congressional
legislation. 8 The logic of the rational basis due process and equal
protection cases is that the political processes will prevent abuse, thus
precluding the necessity of court review. 9 Our federalist system of
government dividing power between the central government and our
fifty states requires that the Court enforce the limits on federal power.
Congress, if left to its own devices, will pass laws on anything that
seems politically expedient.10 The idea that the constitutional limits on
federal power will be politically self-correcting is fanciful if not
ludicrous.
In short, the Court’s job in determining the scope of federal power
is crucial. The substantial effects test is the correct test for determining
Congress’ commerce power to regulate intrastate commerce, and the

8

9

10

It is possible that the rational basis test in the commerce power cases may be a
less permissive level of review than in the due process cases. In the due process
cases, there are two moving targets. The law limiting substantive interests must
rationally relate to some legitimate interest, but as applied that means some
conceivable relationship to some conceivably legitimate purpose. In commerce
power cases, there is only one moving target; the federal law limiting local
activities must at least conceivably relate to a fixed object, Congress’
enumerated power to regulate commerce among the several states. The Court
has not indicated that the rational basis test might be more vigorous in the
commerce power cases.
See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch
has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment
of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the
legislature’s actions were irrational.” (footnote omitted)).
See, for example, Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), a case
clarifying the intent requirement in the Federal Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992,
which made it a federal crime to use a firearm to steal a motor vehicle that had
been shipped in interstate commerce. So-called carjacking was likely a crime in
every state. Other than responding to the spate of publicity in the early 1990s
from a number of local carjackings, there was no reason whatsoever for
Congress to pass such a law, yet Congress used the barest connection to
interstate commerce to pass a law no rational person would think was needed. It
all culminated in the waste of judicial review, with Holloway resolving a
conflict in the circuits as to the Act’s definition of specific intent. See id. at 12.

2019

The Commerce Clause

187

rational basis test is the wrong test.11 This Article will first trace the
historical development of substantial effects test as a limit on federal
power. It will argue that the test is an important limit on federal power,
balancing the need to protect our federalist system and its division of
power between the central government and the states with the
flexibility that Congress needs to address national issues. Second, the
Article will develop how the rational basis test became part of the test
for federal commerce power and why it is inconsistent with
constitutional limits. The Article will describe the use of the rational
basis test as a means of achieving federal power to protect violations
of basic civil rights by private entities totally within one state, a power
denied to the federal government by a narrow view of Congress’
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the
normal application of the substantial effects test in terms of commerce
power. The Article will trace the movement of the rational basis test
from a test in a few commerce power cases to the all-purpose test it
appears to be in the Raich case.
II. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND—OUR FEDERALISM
Our Federalism12 refers to our form of government, a sharing of
power between the now fifty states and the central government as
11

12

See James M. McGoldrick, Katzenbach v. McClung: The Abandonment of
Federalism in the Name of Rational Basis, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 1 (1999) for my
first discussion on this issue, which I addressed some twenty-years ago. Other
than as specifically cited, no part of this article comes from my earlier effort.
Justice Black stated the concept well, “[T]he National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to
describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism,’ and one familiar with the
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound
to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of
‘Our Federalism,’ . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born
in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important
place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44–45 (1971). Under the first government, after gaining our freedom from the
British, the Articles of Confederation created more of a confederation, a loose
association of the first thirteen colonies, as the states were then called, in a
shared form of government. There was a central government only if the most
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represented by the Congress. The best description of this federalist
form of government is not in the original Constitution 13 but in the
Tenth Amendment, which was part of the later added Bill of Rights:
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”14
Like all discussions of our federalist form of government, the
Supreme Court’s part of that story begins in 1819 with McCulloch v.
Maryland.15 Chief Justice John Marshall could hardly have been more
extravagant in his claim of importance for the case involving
Maryland’s tax of between one and two percent16 on the face value of

13

14

15

16

minimal sense; the central government that existed was fully subject to state
control. Under the Articles of Confederation, each of the colonies had equal
power, and it took a consensus of all thirteen colonies for it to be amended. The
central government, to the degree that there was one, only had the power as
granted to it by the vote of all of the colonies.
The United States Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of states in
1787 and replaced the Articles of Confederation as the embodiment of our
national and state form of government. It is of passing interest that the new
Constitution was itself of questionable legality in that it provided that only nine
of the states had to approve it for it to replace the Articles of Confederation.
Eventually, all of the original thirteen colonies ratified the new Constitution
seeming to effectively moot any claim of illegality. Unlike the Articles of
Confederation, the Constitution specifically gave the central government a
number of enumerated powers, the overwhelming majority found in Article I,
Section 8, Clauses 1 through 18, with Clause 18 being the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
U.S. CONST. amend. X. In furtherance of a promise made during the ratification
debate for the United States Constitution to add civil rights protections to the
United States Constitution, the first Congress in 1789 proposed twelve
amendments to the Constitution, ten of which were ratified by the requisite
number of states in 1791, becoming part of the constitution. The TwentySeventh Amendment was one of twelve proposed amendments by Congress in
1789, but it was not ratified until 1992. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment limits
when a congressional pay raise becomes effective. See Schaffer v. Clinton, 240
F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 2001). Schaffer held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to challenge a cost of living increase as being contrary to the TwentySeventh Amendment. Id. at 886.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). McCulloch and the shortened form
M’Culloch are used interchangeably by various sources, but McCulloch seems
the more modern choice.
The taxing scheme was hardly a model of logical clarity. The tax started out at
2% on a $5 Bank of the United States note, and then reduced to 1.5% on a $20
note, 1% on a $50 note, only to revert to 2% on a $500 note. In lieu of the tax on
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banknotes issued by the federally chartered Bank of the United
States.17
The constitution of our country, in its most interesting
and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting
powers of the government of the Union and of its
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be
discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially
influence the great operations of the government. No
tribunal can approach such a question without a deep
sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility
involved in its decision.18
Marshall got quickly to the issue, “The first question made in the cause
is—has congress power to incorporate a bank?”19 If Congress had the
power to incorporate the Bank of the United States, then the state tax
on it was unconstitutional. 20 Under the Supremacy Clause, 21 federal

17

18

19
20

the individual bank notes, the Bank could also pay a yearly tax of $15,000.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 321.
The Bank of the United States was a quasi-public entity which helped the
federal government manage its basic financial obligations, but it was politically
controversial for many reasons, including its connection to the Federalist Party
long since eclipsed by Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans, its
lending policies which led to failure of some state banks, and a high level of
corruption, including at the Baltimore branch at issue in the McCulloch case. As
summarized by Professors Plous and Baker, “In the minds of much of the public
the Bank of the United States was a ruthless and irresponsible institution,
controlled by a small group of private bankers for personal profit. The federal
government held a minor share of stock and held no actual control over the
Bank’s policies. While much of the antagonism was emotional, and while the
Bank perhaps received more blame for economic conditions than it deserved, a
good deal of the disrepute was justified (as indicated above) by poor
management and selfish profit-seeking.” Harold J. Plous & Gordon E.
Baker, Mcculloch v. Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REV.
710, 719 (1957).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 400. There are some who agree with Marshall’s
assessment of the importance of the case. See Plous & Gordon, supra note 17, at
710–20 (“Few cases in the history of American constitutional law can match the
significance and long-range implications of McCulloch v. Maryland. Often
considered the greatest of Chief Justice John Marshall’s decisions, it is familiar
to later generations of students not only as the landmark case in the development
of American federalism, but also as a classic example of solemn Marshallian
rhetoric.”).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

190

UMass Law Review

v. 14 | 182

law is supreme over inconsistent state law and Marshall said that a
state tax would necessarily be the “power to destroy”22 the federally
chartered bank, thus inconsistent with federal law, and under the
Supremacy Clause would be invalid.23
The supremacy of federal law over inconsistent state law seems
incontrovertible, and Marshall had little doubt as to Congress’ power
to incorporate the bank.24 In upholding federal power, Marshall framed
the basic black letter law for every federal law: “This government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”25 But despite
the fact that the Constitution did not anywhere mention the enumerated
power to incorporate a bank,26 this black letter rule was no obstacle.
The Constitution empowered the central government “to lay and
21

22
23

24

25
26

Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution reads: “This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” See generally, Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy
Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 559 (2013),
which nicely summarizes the various historical and scholarly issues related to
the Supremacy Clause, and leads to Professor Ramsey’s straight-forward
conclusion, “The Constitution’s text gives Congress power to displace state laws
to the extent state laws interfere with federal interests.” Id. at 593.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 427.
Id. at 405 (“If any one proposition could command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the Union,
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”). As for the
application of the Supremacy Clause to the state tax, Marshall stated, “That the
power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat
and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in
conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of
another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.”
Id. at 431.
See id. at 401–02. It was of some importance to Marshall that the law
incorporating the bank had the imprimatur of the very first Congress and that it
was passed after open political debate: “The power now contested was exercised
by the first congress elected under the present constitution. The bill for
incorporating the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting
legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and
was opposed with equal zeal and ability.” Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406 (“Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a
bank or creating a corporation.”).
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collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies,”27 and this
power over the “sword and the purse”28 included the implied power29
to select means to accomplish the enumerated powers or ends.30
Nonetheless, this implied power to choose means to accomplish
enumerated ends was not without limits.31 The Constitution required
that means must bear a “necessary and proper” relationship to the
enumerated ends. 32 Necessary, Marshall said, did not mean “an
absolute physical necessity” but rather “no more than that one thing is
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.” 33 Marshall later
27

28
29

30

31

32

33

Id. at 407. The power to tax and the power to borrow are found in Clause 1 of
Article I, Section 8; the power to regulate commerce in Clause 3; the power to
declare war in Clause 11; the power to support armies in Clause 12; and the
power to maintain a navy in Clause 13.
Id.
Id. at 406 (“But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of
confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described.”).
Id. at 409–10 (“The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it, the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason,
be allowed to select the means . . . .”).
Id. at 411–12 (“But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of
congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers
conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of
powers is added, that of making ‘all laws which shall be necessary and proper,
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department
thereof.’”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”) (the
bracketed addition comes from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1)).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413 (“Does it always import an absolute physical
necessity, so strong, that one thing to which another may be termed necessary,
cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its
use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it
frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or
essential to another.”). The Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock used a
version of this phrase in finding that Congress had power under the Commerce
Clause to impose civil sentences to sexually dangerous persons who had been
convicted of an underlying federal crime, “Accordingly, the Necessary and
Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal
legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are
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concluded, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate . . . .” 34 Of the
choices “convenient,” “useful,” “essential” or “appropriate,” history
shows that the one word that best sums up the necessary and proper
requirement in the Constitution for the relationship between means and
enumerated ends is “appropriate.” If the word appropriate is hardly
conclusive in McCulloch itself for the required means to the ends
relationship, there is little doubt that it has carried the day in history.
Of the seventeen amendments added to the United States Constitution
since McCulloch, eight of them included enabling or enforcement
clauses, little necessary and proper clauses, each of the eight including
the word “appropriate” in enabling Congress to enforce the substantive
provisions of the amendment.35
In McCulloch, Marshall does not actually attempt to determine if
the Bank was appropriate to any particular enumerated power. He
readily acknowledged that there was no enumerated power to
incorporate a bank or anything else, but among the enumerated powers
was the power “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate
commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support
armies and navies.” 36 While the power to collect taxes, to borrow
money, perhaps even to regulate commerce seemed to have the most

34
35

36

‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
The first amendment to use the term appropriate and typical of the other seven is
the Thirteenth Amendment, which reads, “Section 2. Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” The eight amendments using
the term “appropriate” as part of its enabling clause are the Thirteenth (the
prohibition of slavery), the Fourteenth (the protection of privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection rights), the Fifteenth (the bar on
use of race in voting), the Eighteenth (the prohibition of manufacture and sale of
alcohol), the Nineteenth (the grant of the right to vote without regard to gender),
the Twenty-Fourth (the ban on poll tax for voting in federal elections), and the
Twenty-Sixth (the grant of eighteen-year-olds the right to vote). The Eighteenth
Amendment is unique in that both the federal government and the states are
granted the “concurrent power” to pass appropriate legislation. States are not
limited by the enumerated power concept, and thus in the Eighteenth
Amendment the point likely was to allow the states to regulate alcohol sales
without the normal restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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logical connection to the Bank of the United States, Marshall took the
national security route:37
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the
Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to
be marched and supported. 38 The exigencies of the
nation may require, that the treasure raised in the north
should be transported to the south, that raised in the
east, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be
reversed. Is that construction of the constitution to be
preferred, which would render these operations
difficult, hazardous and expensive?39
Other than the general reference to a number of different possible
enumerated powers and specifically the need to pay the salary of
federal troops, Marshall made no effort to determine with which power
the Bank of the United States was appropriate. He just made it so by
concluding, “After the most deliberate consideration, it is the
unanimous and decided opinion of this court, that the act to
incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance
of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land.”40
37

38

39
40

The Court’s resort to national security to justify federal power is not without
controversy. But its use in McCulloch is hardly the worst offender. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944), abrogated by Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“In the light of the principles we announced
in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war
power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”).
This phrasing reminds one of the Marine Hymn, “From the Halls of Montezuma
[t]o the shores of Tripoli,” see USA FLAG SITE, The Marine’s Hymn Lyrics,
http://www.usa-flag-site.org/song-lyrics/the-marines-hymn/
[https://perma.cc/5DH3-3S6N] (last visited Jan. 29, 2019), but unlike the Marine
Hymn the reference here appears to be just to areas geographically remote from
each other, and not related to military battles. St Croix seems to refer to a river
in Minnesota, which would be the North to the Gulf of Mexico’s South. See
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
Saint
Croix,
https://www.nps.gov/sacn/planyourvisit/maps.htm
[https://perma.cc/S7L6LKZJ] (last updated Feb. 15, 2019). St. Croix is also one of the U.S. Virgin
Islands and was purchased from Denmark in 1917 for $25,000,000. See VINOW,
Virgin
Islands
History,
http://www.vinow.com/general_usvi/history/
[https://perma.cc/3EGL-4LXJ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408.
Id. at 424.
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Despite McCulloch’s importance as a case in defining federal
enumerated power broadly, it was singularly unhelpful in
demonstrating how to determine if any particular means was
appropriate.41 Thomas Jefferson had, several years before, expressed
concern about unbounded federal power. As described by Justice
Kennedy in a concurring opinion in United States v. Comstock, “[A]s
Thomas Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely
unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable
game of ‘this is the house that Jack built.’”42 Nothing in McCulloch
41

42

In one of the first cases to refer to the holding of McCulloch, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said only, “The term necessary, is not however to be confined to
cases of absolute necessity, but extends to cases of convenience also.” Bank of
the N. Liberties v. Cresson, 1825 WL 1907, at *4 (Pa. Apr. 8, 1825). McCulloch
was cited in a few earlier cases, but generally only as to the holding related to
the Bank. A Connecticut state court concluded its discussion of the legitimacy of
the Bank with these obsequious words, “I am, therefore, clearly of opinion, that
the act of Congress incorporating the bank of the United States, is a law made in
pursuance of the constitution; and advise, that judgment be rendered for the
defendants. In coming to this conclusion, I have been relieved from an anxious
responsibility, by the luminous and cogent reasons of Chief Justice Marshall,
in McCulloch v. Maryland, upon the general question of the constitutionality of
the charter . . . .” Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 317, 322 (Conn. 1822).
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In Comstock, the Supreme Court found within federal commerce power a federal
law providing for civil commitment of sexually dangerous predators, “Taken
together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the statute is a ‘necessary
and proper’ means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to
create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to
provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those
who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of
others.” Id. at 149. Kennedy referenced the original sources: “Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800), 31 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 547 (B. Oberg ed.2004).” Id. at 150. Kennedy also referred to
a modern expression of a similar concern by the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 628 (10th Cir. 2006). Patton quoted the following
language from Judge Posner in United States v. Marrero, “[W]e are in a new era
and must be wary of such arguments as that the theft of a bottle of aspirin from a
person’s home ‘affects’ commerce, provided only that the bottle was shipped
from another state, because the homeowner would be likely to buy another
bottle from his local druggist to replace the one that was stolen and the druggist
would replace that sale by purchasing another bottle interstate.” Patton, 451
F.3d at 628 (quoting United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir.
2002)). Marrero upheld the application of the federal Hobbs Act, which makes a
federal crime of robberies that obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, to the
robbery of two drug dealers who had been enticed by federal agents to travel
from Detroit, Michigan to Chicago, Illinois. See generally Marrero, 299 F.3d
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necessarily supports “the house that Jack built” logic for federal
enumerated power, but neither does it alleviate that concern. Pretty
much, all Marshall said was that the Bank could be helpful—and thus
appropriate—in paying federal troops in remote areas of North
America.
III. GIBBONS V. OGDEN—COMMERCE, TO REGULATE, AND THE
PREPOSITION
The first enumerated power to be defined with any detail43 was the
commerce power44 in Gibbons v. Ogden,45 and the breadth of power
recognized in Gibbons was “embracing and penetrating” in its scope.46

43

44

45
46

653. That interstate trip was enough to bring the case within federal commerce
power. Id. at 655. “The Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies that obstruct or
otherwise affect interstate or foreign commerce, and the main issue raised by
this appeal [was] whether the robbery of the drug dealers had the requisite effect
on commerce.” Id. at 654. Patton found within Congress’ commerce power a
federal law barring convicted felons from owning body armor because the law
applied only to an item that had “moved across state lines at some point in its
existence.” Patton, 451 F.3d at 635.
Even at the lower court level, there were few attempts to define federal power as
to any enumerated power. Most of the early lower court cases involved little
more than a cite to McCulloch. One of the early lower federal court cases
involved the power of Congress to give jurisdiction “in any circuit court of the
United States” as to any case involving the Bank of the United States. Bank of
the U.S. v. Roberts, 2 F. Cas. 728, 729 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1822). One South Carolina
court found that McCulloch did not apply to a Charleston city tax on Bank stock
held by an individual residing in Charleston, “I think it has been before shown,
that the interest of the United States and the individual stockholders are distinct
and independent.” Bulow v. City Council of Charleston, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott &
McC.) 527, 530 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1819).
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964). The Court in
Katzenbach summarized Congress’ interstate commerce power in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 3 and Clause 18 as conferring “upon Congress the power ‘(t)o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States’ and Clause 18 of the same
Article grants it the power ‘(t)o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers’ . . . .” Id. The
Commerce Clause has been the subject of much litigation. As one lower court
put it, “In spite of its simplicity and clarity and because of the constantly
increasing ‘interpenetrations of modern society,’ it has spawned thousands of
cases.” McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 821 (N.D. Ala.), rev’d, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). The Court in Wickard stated, “At
the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the Federal commerce power
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Gibbons paralleled McCulloch in that both cases involved a conflict
between federal law and state law with federal law being supreme over
state law if the federal law was passed pursuant to some federally
enumerated power. In Gibbons, New York and New Jersey had given
a monopoly on steamboat traffic between New York and New Jersey
to Fulton and Livingston, who were credited with the invention of the
steamboat, and who had, in turn, granted a license to Ogden. 47
Marshall read federal law as giving Gibbons a license to operate
interstate, including between New York and New Jersey.48 If Congress
had the federal power to give Gibbons a license, then the New York
and New Jersey monopoly to Fulton and Livingston—and their

47
48

with a breadth never yet exceeded.” Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist would seem to
disagree that Gibbons was the pinnacle of commerce power, “Jones & Laughlin
Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that
Clause.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995). Lopez found that
Congress did not have the commerce power to criminalize the possession of a
gun on public school grounds. Id. at 551.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1–2.
Marshall latched on to the Federal Coastal Act of 1793 as being the source of
Gibbon’s license. It is unlikely that the federal law had any such intention. As
argued in the case, the law gave “no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to
confer the American character,” that is, it was intended only to register a vessel
as being from the United States. Id. at 21. Marshall concluded that the law’s use
of the term “license” meant otherwise and was “founded too clearly in the words
of the law, to require the support of any additional observations.” Id. Marshall
relied on the federal law and the Supremacy Clause to avoid having to decide
whether the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to the federal government all by
itself prevented New York and New Jersey from regulating items in interstate
commerce. This use of the Commerce Clause to limit state power is popularly
referred to as the Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause and is beyond the
scope of this article except as to its impact on federal enumerated power. Daniel
Webster arguing for Gibbons relied primarily on the Dormant Commerce Clause
argument that the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce meant that
the states could not. Id. at 209. Marshall was sympathetic to the Dormant
Commerce Clause argument and conceded, “There is great force in this
argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.” Id. But
Marshall said that he did not need to resolve whether Congress’ power in the
constitution by itself precluded state regulations of interstate commerce. In
Gibbons, a much easier argument was available to Marshall. There was a federal
law, the state law was inconsistent with it, and under the Supremacy Clause, the
state law was invalid. Marshall summarized the importance of the Supremacy
Clause, “In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and
the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield to it.” Id. at 211.
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franchise to Ogden—was inconsistent with that federal license and,
under the Supremacy Clause, was invalid.
Marshall’s opinion first defines federal commerce power broadly,
it then expresses agreement with the Dormant Commerce Clause
argument, and finally concludes that a federal license preempted the
state monopoly.
As Marshall read it, the Federal Coastal Act of 1793 gave Gibbons
a federal license to operate his steamboat Bellona anywhere in the
coastal areas of the United States: “The license must be understood to
be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to the steamboat
Bellona, ‘to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one
year from this date.’” 49 Since this included in the case steamboat
traffic between New York and New Jersey, it would seem to easily fall
within Congress’ power to regulate commerce among the several
states, but Marshall’s definition of commerce power, which gave each
element the broadest definition possible, went far beyond the facts of
the case.50
Marshall begins his discussion of the federal commerce power
with the text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3: “The words are,
‘Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’”51
He then defines it in this order (1) the noun “commerce,” (2) the
preposition “among,” and finally (3) the verb “to regulate.”
Surprisingly, it is his definition of the preposition “among” that
bedevils us to this day. As to the easy parts of the definitions, Marshall
said that commerce included all forms of commercial intercourse,52

49
50

51
52

Id. at 214.
See id. at 189–90. Indeed, before turning to the commerce power itself, Marshall
rejected the notion that federal enumerated power should be strictly constructed,
and though not citing McCulloch at all, restated his approach in McCulloch that
federal powers were to be interpreted generously: “This instrument contains an
enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It
has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought
they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives
countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which
grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is
authorized ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper’ for the
purpose.” Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 189–90 (“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts
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including navigation. 53 The power “to regulate” was “complete,” 54
“plenary,”55 and only limited by the power of the people to vote.56 It is
hard to imagine a more comprehensive definition of either
“commerce” or “to regulate,” but the definitions, though expansive,
hardly seem revolutionary. Commerce not only included the horse and
buggy, but also steamboat traffic, intercontinental jets, and, perhaps in
the future, the Starship Enterprise. The verb to regulate included not
only the power to impose conditions but also the power to eliminate
interstate commerce altogether.
But despite the broadness of the definitions of commerce and to
regulate, it is the definition of the preposition57 “among”58 that was so

53

54

55

56

57

of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying
on that intercourse.”).
Id. at 190 (“All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word
‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.”).
Id. at 196 (“[The commerce] power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”).
Id. at 197 (“[Congress’ power over commerce] is plenary as to those objects, the
power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is
vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government . . . .”).
More specifically, the existence of the states did not limit federal power.
Id. (“[T]he influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as
in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.”).
Dictionary.com defines a preposition as “any member of a class of words found
in many languages that are used before nouns, pronouns, or other substantives to
form phrases functioning as modifiers of verbs, nouns, or adjectives, and that
typically express a spatial, temporal, or other relationship, as in, on, by, to,
since.”
Preposition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preposition?s=t
[https://perma.cc/9PQRTRLH] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). While prepositions are typically
insignificant connectors, I label “among” The Preposition because to this day its
ambiguity and potential breadth continue to confound the relationship of
commerce to states and activities within the states. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The
Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (where Professor Balkin elevates the
famous footnote number 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., to
legendary status with The Ohio State and The City (San Francisco)). Carolene
Products is commonly cited as the origin of the rational basis test for due
process issues, but in Footnote 4 it recognized that laws impacting rights such as
free speech or impacting minority rights might get a higher level of review.
Prepositions are stinky little words, and one should never end a sentence with
one for it is considered only slightly less gauche than blowing your nose on your
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sweeping that it is at the core of even modern cases such as Raich.
Congress had the power to regulate commerce “with” foreign nations
and the Indian tribes but comparatively it had the power to regulate
“commerce among the several states.” It is of interest that the framers
used the preposition “with” for foreign commerce and “among” with
regard to interstate commerce, but it is hard to draw any conclusions
from that different choice. “Commerce among the States must, of
necessity, be commerce with the States,” is how Marshall summed up
the different prepositions. 59 In practice, however, there is no real
difference between Congress’ commerce power with foreign nations
and its power among the several states.60

58

59
60

napkin. And what devils they are, suddenly converting pronouns from the first
or second person to the third person; if a she does not become a her after a
preposition, it is a mark of bad grammar that trips up even the most literate
among us. See The I’s Have It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24oconner.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/7JF5-C4ST] (“Since his election [] president [Obama] has
been roundly criticized by bloggers for using “I” instead of “me” in phrases like
“a very personal decision for Michelle and I” or “the main disagreement with
John and I” or “graciously invited Michelle and I.”).
The number one definition of among in Dictionary.com is “in, into, or through
the midst of; in association or connection with; surrounded by: He was among
friends.”
Among,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/among?s=t [https://perma.cc/ZR6H-PUFV]
(last visited Feb.17, 2019). While the definition works with the constitutional
power, the example does not. Synonyms include “between, in the midst of, in
the middle of, with, in the thick of, surrounded by, betwixt, encompassed by, in
dispersion through, amid, and amidst.” Among, THESAURUS.COM,
https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/among [https://perma.cc/QF9U-3VF4] (last
visited Feb. 17, 2019). And antonyms include “away from, outside, separate.”
Id.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 193–94 (“It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words
comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States
and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and
any other, to which this power does not extend.”). And Congress’ power over
foreign commerce certainly includes commerce that begins within the internal
boundaries of each of the states. See id. at 195 (“If it exists within the States, if a
foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the
power of Congress may be exercised within a State.”). In some ways, Congress’
power over foreign commerce is more comprehensive since there are no
federalist concerns to limit its power over foreign commerce. In other ways,
Congress’ power is less comprehensive in that, unlike interstate commerce
power, there could be no claim that Congress’ power over foreign commerce
gives Congress the right to regulate internal matters of foreign countries.
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Marshall gives an all-encompassing definition of among. Marshall
defined among to mean “intermingled with” which to him meant that
commerce among the several states did not stop at the borders of each
state but included the interior of the state as well.61 Certainly, among
could mean intermingled with in that a person might be found among
those or intermingled with those protesting the separation of children
at the border, but it is hardly the most logical meaning of among. The
most logical definition would seem to be the common synonym for
among, that is, “between” the several states. By picking a broader
definition, Marshall gives support for congressional regulation of
matters totally within one state. As he puts it, “Commerce among the
States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may
be introduced into the interior.”62 Logically, this has to be true. The
border is but a line in the sand where nothing happens; commerce has
to cross that line. Or as Marshall reasoned, “Can a trading expedition
between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of
each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote
from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other,
and probably pass through a third?” 63 One cannot argue with that
logic, but Marshall took it a step further.
He acknowledged that among did not include “that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and
man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States.” 64 Going back to the
preposition, “Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very
properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States
than one.”65 That is, it did not include “the completely interior traffic
of a State”66 or “the exclusively internal commerce of a State.”67

61

62
63
64
65
66
67

Congress’ power to regulate commerce with foreign nations includes that
portion within any state, but its power does not reach into the internal commerce
of any foreign country.
Id. at 194 (“The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce
‘among the several States.’ The word ‘among’ means intermingled with. A thing
which is among others, is intermingled with them.”).
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
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Though among did not include commerce exclusively within one
state, there was an important qualifying phrase that has carried the day:
“which does not extend to or affect other States.”68 Out of this would
come what is called the Affectation Doctrine—“among the several
states” included local activity that affected other states. To emphasize
that this qualifying phrase was no accident, Marshall includes the
Affectation Doctrine in his summary of his definition of among:
The genius and character of the whole government
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to
those which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the government. The
completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be
considered as reserved for the State itself.69
In short, Congress’ commerce power included (1) “all the external
concerns of the nation,” (2) “those internal concerns which affect the
States generally,” but (3) “not to those which are completely within a
particular state and which do not affect other states,” that is, not to
“[t]he completely internal commerce of a State.” And this definition of
among finds itself in the most common framing of Congress’ power to
regulate interstate commerce: “First, Congress can regulate
the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress has authority
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has the
power
to
regulate
activities
that
substantially
70
affect interstate commerce.”
68
69

70

Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
Id. at 195. Almost fifty years later, the Court held that Congress had the power
to regulate steamboat traffic exclusively between points within one state because
of the impact on interstate commerce. See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 565 (1870)
(“So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or
goods brought from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within
that State, she was engaged in commerce between the States, and however
limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as it went, subject to the
legislation of Congress.”). The case was based in part on Congress’ power to
regulate navigable waters, a derivative power flowing from Article III. See
generally id.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (citations omitted).
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Despite the internal lack of logic of this summary of the commerce
power, 71 this common statement of Congress’ commerce power as
restated here by the Raich opinion is the most common modern
framing and includes both “the external concerns,” which is broken
into two parts channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and “those internal concerns,” which is defined as “activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” Gibbons and its modern
framing mean that Congress has two types of commerce power. First,
Congress has the ability to regulate anything “in commerce,” that is,
anything crossing from one state into another state. This is the clearest
form of federal power, regulating things in commerce. Second,
Congress has the ability to regulate local activities affecting interstate
commerce, which are activities totally within one state but affecting
other states or the national interest.
IV. AFTER GIBBONS, THE COURT DETOURS ON ITS WAY TO 1937,
BUT NOT ALWAYS.
Marshall’s broad view of Congress’ commerce carried the day in
1937 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel. 72 As discussed later, the
Court expanded Jones & Laughlin Steel’s view of the commerce
power with the addition of the rational basis test in Katzenbach v.
McClung.73 McClung’s rational basis approach was enshrined as the
law in Raich, but this expansionist view of commerce power was not
without its detours. The detours were a product of a number of factors,
but one of the most important was that Congress had done little to
71

72
73

This issue is discussed later, but Professor Engdahl captures the illogic perfectly:
“Chief Justice Rehnquist’s taxonomy of the commerce power—now intoned as a
ceremonial incantation by every inferior court—is positively dysfunctional. The
cases involving ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ certainly
are Commerce Clause cases, but the ‘instrumentalities’ cases, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist put in the same category, are really Necessary and
Proper Clause cases. The same is true for some of the ‘channel’ cases, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist separated out as category one, and all of the ‘affecting’
cases, which he segregated as category three. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s attempt
at categorization is akin to a zoologist describing vertebrates as comprised of
three groups—herbivores, mammals, and primates. Such confused classification
obscures the very distinctions that are essential to understanding and utility.”
David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint
on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 115 (1998)
(citations omitted).
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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regulate interstate commerce after Gibbons, and the states passed most
of the regulations.74 The Court opinions upholding state power were
then corrupted to justify limiting federal power.
One major detour was in 1895 in United States v. E.C. Knight
when the Court said that commerce did not include manufacturing75
and a second detour in 1918 in Hammer v. Dagenhart when the Court
gave a limited definition of interstate commerce.76 Later, the stream of
commerce cases detoured around the E.C. Knight detour. Two other
detours around Gibbons were the direct/indirect test and the doctrine
of dual federalism. In an incomprehensible way, the direct/indirect test
limited Congress’ ability to regulate activity affecting interstate
commerce, and the doctrine of dual federalism twisted the Supremacy
Clause on its head. All four of these detours are historical oddities and
later rejected or distinguished in Jones & Laughlin Steel and later
cases. They, however, controlled the narrative from roughly 1890 to
1937.
In E.C. Knight, the Court held that Congress did not have the
commerce power to regulate a business trust77 with a monopoly78 on
74

75

76

77

78

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“For nearly a century,
however, decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with
questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under
the Clause and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it
was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce.”). Gibbons
itself, it might be noted, was not really an attempt to expand Congress’ powers,
but just a regulation of vessels as originating in the United States, which
Marshall then used to expand federal commerce power and to limit state
regulation of interstate commerce.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). There are differences of
opinion as to where the Court went the wrong way. Justice Thomas argues that
the Court abandoned the constitutional scheme when it departed from E.C.
Knight. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“If anything, the ‘wrong turn’ was the Court’s dramatic departure
in the 1930’s from a century and a half of precedent.”), superseded by statute,
18 U.S.C. § 922, as recognized in United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th
Cir. 2005).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
See
Trust,
SMALL
BUS.
DEV.
CORP.,
https://www.smallbusiness.wa.gov.au/business-advice/business-structure/trust
[https://perma.cc/K2LB-KSAB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“A trust is a
structure where a trustee carries out the business on behalf of the trust’s
members (or beneficiaries). A trust is not a separate legal entity.”).
See E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 9 (“By the purchase of the stock of the four
Philadelphia refineries with shares of its own stock the American Sugar
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refined sugar. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 79 passed in 1890
specifically referred to the commerce power and stated, “Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” The Court said that
manufacturing was not commerce; therefore, it was not subject to the
federal commerce power.80 The flaw in the Court’s reasoning was that
even if manufacturing itself was not commerce, Congress under
Gibbons could regulate anything within one state affecting interstate
commerce.81 The incorrect holding in E.C. Knight was followed in a
number of cases.82

79

80

81

82

Refining Company acquired nearly complete control of the manufacture of
refined sugar within the United States.”).
The E.C. Knight case does not actually refer to the act by this name, but it was
the commonly used name. Id.
Id. at 13 (“The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state
does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the
manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes
from the control of the state and belongs to commerce.”).
The E.C. Knight decision was buttressed by the 1888 case, Kidd v. Pearson,
which had held that Iowa could bar the manufacturing of liquors in Iowa, all of
it sold outside of the state of Iowa. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888). The
Court said the fact that “an article was manufactured for export to another state
does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce.” Id. at 24. The Kidd
Court cited Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886) in support. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 24.
Coe had held that the town of Errol, New Hampshire had the right to tax logs
being held in its rivers for transport interstate to Maine. Coe, 116 U.S. 517, 528–
29 (1886). Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the city could not tax
interstate commerce, but the Court said, the logs were not interstate commerce
until the interstate journey actually began. Id. The point of both Kidd and Coe
was to uphold state power, but E.C. Knight used them to impose a limit on
federal power. The E.C. Knight court was in error. However accurate either Kidd
or Coe was with regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limits on state
power, Congress could still regulate in-state commerce and activities that were
not interstate commerce if the local activity affected interstate commerce. As the
Court said a half-century later, “The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as
the making of a contract or combination usually is” but “[i]f it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
applies the squeeze.” United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336
U.S. 460, 464 (1949). The case involved an antitrust action against a trade
organization of jobbers buying and selling fabrics for women’s sportswear. Id. at
461–62.
Justice Thomas believes that the Court went astray when it ceased to follow E.C.
Knight. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
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In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court limited Congress’ ability to
regulate things moving in interstate commerce. The Court held that
Congress did not have the power to bar the interstate shipment of
goods manufactured by child labor. Because of E.C. Knight, Congress
thought that it could not regulate manufacturing using child labor, so it
sought to regulate the interstate shipment of goods made by child
labor, what under Gibbons would be the clearest form of commerce
among the several states, and commerce from one state to another
state. Hammer stopped this leapfrog over E.C. Knight it its tracks:
“The making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce, nor
does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped, or used in
interstate commerce, make their production a part thereof.” 83 The
Court distinguished a number of cases that had seemed to allow the
regulation of anything traveling in interstate commerce.84

83

84

concurring) (“If federal power extended to these types of production
‘comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state
control.’ Id. [E.C. Knight]. . . Whether or not manufacturing, agriculture, or
other matters substantially affected interstate commerce was irrelevant.”),
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, as recognized in United States v.
Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). In a later case, Justice Thomas
summarized his limiting view of commerce power. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write
separately only to express my view that the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’
test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding
of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases. By
continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, however
circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in
its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. Until this Court
replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918), overruled in part by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Congress could
pass a law to keep the channels of commerce free from use in the transportation
of tickets used in the promotion of lottery schemes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (sustaining the power of Congress to pass the Pure
Food and Drug Act which prohibited the introduction into the states by means of
interstate commerce of impure foods and drugs; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308 (1913) (upholding the constitutionality of the so-called ‘White Slave Traffic
Act’ that forbade the transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for the
purpose of prostitution); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
(holding that Congress could prohibit the transportation of women in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes); James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry.
Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding the power of Congress over the interstate
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In attempting to avoid the E.C. Knight limitation on Congress’
ability to regulate things affecting interstate commerce, the Court used
what it called the stream of commerce85 to create a loophole to E.C.
Knight. If local activity in one state was connected to local activity in
other states, the Court found that the local activity was in the stream of
commerce and thus Congress had the power to regulate interstate
commerce between two states. 86 The most famous examples of the
stream of commerce cases are Swift & Company v. United States87 and

85

86

87

transportation of intoxicating liquors. The Hammer court distinguished these
other cases as involving the need to use a ban on interstate commerce to prevent
the spread of evil results). In Hammer, there were no evil products being
transported. The Court also said that the Child Labor Act violated the Tenth
Amendment in that “[I]t must never be forgotten that the nation is made up of
states to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And to them and
to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are
reserved.” Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275. Here Hammer repeats the error of the
doctrine of dual federalism.
The enumerated power stream of commerce cases morphed into a due process
personal jurisdictional issue, but personal jurisdiction, whether a state has
sufficient contact with a party, is a completely different issue. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“The forum State
does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State.”).
Perhaps the best example is found in Congress’ attempt to regulate the deceptive
practices in stockyards in the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. The Court
tied stockyards to the full distribution of meat from pasture to table, it found that
“The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of
livestock arrive daily by carload and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold
and disposed of and moved out, to give place to the constantly flowing traffic
that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current
flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current
from the West to the East, and from one state to another.” Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U.S. 495, 515–16 (1922).
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Swift & Co. does not actually
use the stream of commerce phrase, calling it “a current of commerce.” Id. at
399. The Court later extravagantly claimed that Swift & Co. “was a milestone in
the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. It recognized the
great changes and development in the business of this vast country and drew
again the dividing line between interstate and intrastate commerce where the
Constitution intended it to be. It refused to permit local incidents of great
interstate movement, which taken alone were intrastate, to characterize the
movement as such.” Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 35
(1923). If Swift & Co. was a milestone, its impact was limited. Professor
Cushman found only four cases before 1937 where the Court upheld a federal
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Stafford v. Wallace.88 As in E.C. Knight, Swift & Co. was charged
with violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The claim was that Swift
& Co. had rigged bids with competitors in buying livestock in
Chicago, Omaha, Kansas City, and other cities. Swift & Co.’s defense
was that the activity in each of the states was not commerce, because
like manufacturing the activity was totally within one state and did not
involve the crossing of state lines. Because Swift & Co. eventually
converted the livestock to fresh meat for human consumption and sent
it to plants in various states, the Court said that the various interstate
aspects of the business fell within “the current of commerce” and was
within Congress’ commerce power.89
Stafford was an attempt to regulate the stockyards more generally.
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 gave the Secretary of

88

89

law under the stream of commerce doctrine. See Barry Cushman, The Structure
of Classical Public Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1917, 1936 (2008). In addition to
Swift & Co. and Stafford, Cushman identifies another stockyard’ case, Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930), where the Court
upheld under the Packers and Stockyards Act the right of the Secretary of
Agriculture to fix the commission of agents selling livestock at the Omaha,
Nebraska stockyards. The fourth case in this small group was Board of Trade of
City of Chicago v. Olsen, which upheld the federal Grain Futures Act’s
restrictions on the Chicago Board of trade, what the Court called “the greatest
grain market in the world.” Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 262 U.S. at 33.
Referencing Stafford, the Court held, “The sales on the Chicago Board of Trade
are just as indispensable to the continuity of the flow of wheat from the West to
the mills and distributing points of the East and Europe, as are the Chicago sales
of cattle to the flow of stock toward the feeding places and slaughter and
packing houses of the East.” Id. at 36. The Court also used the stream-ofcommerce phrase in upholding the right of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) to compel the New York Central Railroad Company to
install a connecting line to the Erie Barge Canal in Buffalo, New York. The
Court said that the ICC “intended to confer upon the Commission power to
regulate the entire stream of commerce. Whereas here interstate and intrastate
transactions are interwoven, the regulation of the latter is so incidental to and
inseparable from the regulation of the former as properly to be deemed included
in the authority over interstate commerce conferred by statute.” United States v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 457, 464 (1926) (emphasis added).
Stafford, 258 U.S. 495. Stafford does use the phrase “stream of commerce.” Id.
at 519.
Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 398–99 (“When cattle are sent for sale from a place in
one state, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in
another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to
find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly
recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the
states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.”).
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Agriculture, Secretary Wallace, authority to regulate a whole series of
“unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices.”90 Again, the defense
was that stockyards involved activity like manufacturing that was
entirely within one state and not interstate commerce. The Court
following what it called Swift & Company’s “natural development of
interstate commerce under modern conditions” and concluded that the
inherently interstate aspects of the livestock business meant:
[T]hat such streams of commerce from one part of the
country to another, which are ever flowing, are in their
very essence the commerce among the states and with
foreign nations, which historically it was one of the
chief purposes of the Constitution to bring under
national protection and control.91
Under the streams of commerce logic, Congress could regulate local
activity within one state not based upon its effect on interstate
commerce but because it fell within Congress’ power to regulate
things in commerce.92 The Court avoided its limiting precedent in E.C.
Knight as to things affecting interstate commerce by creating the
fiction that a series of local activities in different states was in “the
stream of commerce” and thus within Congress power to regulate
things in interstate commerce.93
90
91
92

93

Stafford, 258 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 518–19.
The Hammer limitation on regulating things interstate that were not evil in and
of themselves was not yet part of the equation. “In each of these instances the
use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful
results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was to
regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities
of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.” Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 271 (1918).
Part of the explanation for Congress’ more expansive view of commerce likely
begins with Upton’s Sinclair’s The Jungle exposing the health hazards in the
meat and packing industry leading to the passage of the federal Food and Drug
Act and to the Court’s more sympathetic view of the need for federal regulation
of health-related matters. The Pure Food and Drug Act passed in 1906 for the
first time regulated food and drugs that moved in interstate commerce and
forbade the manufacture, sale or transportation of poisonous patent medicines.
“It arose, with strong White House support, in the wake of exposés by such
muckrakers as Upton Sinclair and Samuel Hopkins Adams.” Andrew Glass,
Pure Food and Drug Act Passes, June 23, 1906, POLITICO (June 23, 2014, 12:02
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/fda-theodore-roosevelt-108164
[https://perma.cc/8Q57-PGT3].
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Whatever the reason for the “streams of commerce” clause
doctrine, it soon died a lingering death, a victim of the same laissezfaire doctrine that led to the weakening of the commerce power in E.C.
Knight and Hammer. In 1935, the Court in Schechter Poultry v. United
States 94 held that the doctrine did not apply to commerce that had
already ended, and in 1936 in Carter v. Carter Coal,95 the Court held
that it did not apply to commerce that had not yet started. The Carter
court said it this way:
The restricted field covered by the Swift and kindred
cases is illustrated by the Schechter Case. There the
commodity in question, although shipped from another
state, had come to rest in the state of its destination,
and, as the court pointed out, was no longer in a
current or flow of interstate commerce. The Swift
doctrine was rejected as inapposite. In the Schechter
Case the flow had ceased. Here it had not begun. The
difference is not one of substance. The applicable
principle is the same.96
With the Jones & Laughlin Steel case later eviscerating the E.C.
Knight and the Hammer cases, there was no need for the “stream of
commerce” fiction as a workaround. The Court will still occasionally,
including in Raich, mention the “stream of commerce,” but it is no
longer a meaningful test.97
94

95
96
97

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Schechter found the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), the
cornerstone of President Franklin Roosevelt’s economic recovery program,
unconstitutional as beyond the scope of federal commerce power. Id. at 542. The
NIRA permitted the establishment of codes for fair competition in various
industries—in the case the “Live Poultry Code”—which regulated everything
from conditions of employment to the health of chickens sold. Id. at 521–23.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
One of the post-1937 cases to rely on the stream of Commerce Clause logic was
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n. United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Prior to 1944, insurance had
been held in a number of cases to be within the state’s power to regulate, and
thus it was argued was beyond Congress’ power. The Court held that the
regulation of insurance was within Congress’ commerce power “continuous and
indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of
premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and
communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy
contracts.” Id. at 541. The stream of commerce language was unnecessary since
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One of the more incomprehensible detours in the application of
Gibbons’ broad view of commerce power was the direct/indirect
limitation on Congress’ ability to regulate local activity affecting
interstate commerce. Schechter Poultry was one of the most famous
cases to attempt to limit commerce power to those cases where local
activities directly affected interstate commerce as opposed to only
being indirect. In Schechter Poultry, the National Industrial Recovery
Act, one of President Roosevelt’s most important anti-depression
measures, attempted to mandate wages and limit hours in the live
poultry business in New York City, described as the largest such
market in the United States, with 96% of live poultry coming from
other states before being consigned to so called commission men. In
addition to finding that the chickens were not part of the stream of
commerce because interstate commerce had stopped, the Court also
held that any impact of the chickens on interstate commerce was
indirect. The Court said there was “a necessary and well-established
distinction between direct and indirect effects. The precise line can be
drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in
principle.” 98 It believed that if the Commerce Clause reached “all
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect
effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace

98

the insurance policies affected interstate commerce or, as the Court said, “They
concern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state.” Id. at 542. Even
in Raich, as noted by Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court, the Ninth Circuit
had found that the federal law was outside of federal power in part because
“[T]his limited use is clearly distinct from the broader illicit drug market-as well
as any broader commercial market for medicinal marijuana-insofar as the
medicinal marijuana at issue in this case is not intended for, nor does it enter,
the stream of commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (quoting
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (2003)). Justice Thomas’ dissenting
opinion summarized the lower court’s holding “The Court of Appeals found that
respondents’ ‘limited use is clearly distinct from the broader illicit drug market,’
because ‘th[eir] medicinal marijuana ... is not intended for, nor does it enter,
the stream of commerce.’” Id. at 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice O’Connor among her other reasons for believing that Congress did not
have the power to regulate home-grown home consumed medical marijuana
observed, “Everyone agrees that the marijuana at issue in this case was never in
the stream of commerce, and neither were the supplies for growing it.” Id. at 50
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). It was, she said, one of the few narcotics whose
preparations did not involve at least some of its ingredients moving in interstate
commerce.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546.
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practically all the activities of the people . . . .”99 It concluded that the
hours and wages of persons in the live poultry business did not directly
affect interstate commerce.100
Carter v. Carter Coal 101 attempted to define the difference
between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce. Under the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Congress gave a
commission broad authority to regulate, including wage and hour
provisions. The Court like in Schechter considered the wages and
hours of coal miners to be indirect.102 Carter conceded that whether
any particular activity was direct or indirect was “not always easy to
determine,”103 but it sought to define the difference:
The word ‘direct’ implies that the activity or condition
invoked or blamed shall operate proximately—not
mediately, remotely, or collaterally—to produce the
effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient
intervening agency or condition. And the extent of the
effect bears no logical relation to its character. The
distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns,
not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect,
but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has
been brought about.104
99

100

101
102

103
104

Id. The Court later emphasized the point; “[T]he distinction between direct and
indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce must be
recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our
constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there would be virtually no
limit to the federal power, and for all practical purposes we should have a
completely centralized government.” Id. at 548.
Id. (“The persons employed in slaughtering and selling in local trade are not
employed in interstate commerce. Their hours and wages have no direct relation
to interstate commerce.”).
Carter, 298 U.S. 238.
Id. at 308-09 (“The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but
exclusively in producing a commodity . . . . Such effect as they may have upon
commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.”).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307–08. The continuation of this quote does not make it any more
comprehensible, “If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended
for interstate sale and shipment, and actually so sold and shipped, affects
interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by multiplying
the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the
expense or complexities of the business, or by all combined. . . . But the matter
of degree has no bearing upon the question here, since that question is not—
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This language has the air of mystery to it, perhaps even mysticism,
similar to Justice Andrews’ definition of proximate cause in his
dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company.105 If
there is anything that might send shivers through the spine of law
students and lawyers, it would be comparing anything to the test for
proximate cause. Like the proximate cause test in torts, the
direct/indirect test has no easily discernable meaning. Say
direct/indirect fast, underline it, put it in italics, capitalize it, and tweet
it to the world some early morning, and it is still devoid of meaning.
Jones & Laughlin Steel, and Wickard gave it the quiet death that it
deserved.106

105

106

What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or the extent of the effect
produced upon interstate commerce? but—What is the relation between the
activity or condition and the effect?” Id. at 308.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (“Was there a direct connection between them, without too many
intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the
cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or, by the
exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too
remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.”).
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122–23 (1942) (“In some cases sustaining
the exercise of federal power over intrastate matters the term ‘direct’ was used
for the purpose of stating, rather than of reaching, a result; in others it was
treated as synonymous with ‘substantial’ or ‘material;’ and in others it was not
used at all. Of late its use has been abandoned in cases dealing with questions of
federal power under the Commerce Clause.”). Though dead in the commerce
power cases, the direct/indirect test continues to have some life in the Dormant
Commerce Clause cases. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . Occasionally the Court has candidly
undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it
has spoken in terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and burdens.”) (citations
omitted). In Pike, the Court found that Arizona improperly burdened interstate
commerce by requiring that its cantaloupes be packed in Arizona, as opposed to
in California as the grower preferred. Id. at 144-45. Arizona said that it was
trying to address the fact that consumers falsely believed that Arizona’s
delicious cantaloupes packed in California were grown in California. Id. at 14243. (California only wishes its cantaloupes had such delicacies of flavor.). In
that the direct/indirect test refuses to fully die, it is like Justice Scalia’s
complaint about the Lemon test in the free exercise of religion cases—it is
“some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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Perhaps the most bizarre of the detours in the application of the
Gibbon’s test was the concept called Dual Federalism. 107 Under the
concept, there are some powers exclusively in control of the federal
government, and under the Tenth Amendment, others are exclusively
under the control of state governments. The doctrine is erroneous
because Congress can regulate anything, even if it falls within a state’s
police power when it also falls within one of Congress’ enumerated
powers.108
The doctrine can be found in both E.C. Knight and Hammer.109
The Court’s view in E.C. Knight of the limited scope of commerce was
in part a product of its view of state police power versus Congress’
power. The Court said that the state police power “to protect the lives,
health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the
public morals” was not “surrendered by them to the general
government” and was “essentially exclusive.” 110 But the Court
cautioned, “On the other hand, the power of congress to regulate
107

108

109

110

The Court’s most revealing discussion of the dual federalism doctrine is found
in a spending power case, United States v. Butler, where the Court found that it
did not have to decide if the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was within
Congress spending power, but nonetheless found it unconstitutional because it
usurped state power. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“We are not
now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general welfare of the United
States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within
it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our
Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural adjustment Act. The
act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and
control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the
federal government.”). Justice O’Connor called Butler a mistake not because of
its holding as to the spending power, but “rather its crabbed view of the extent of
Congress’ regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. The Agricultural
Adjustment Act . . . was regulation that today would likely be considered within
Congress’ commerce power.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Dole found that Congress’
conditioning receipt of highway funds on a state’s adopting a 21-year-old
drinking limit was within its spending power. See David E. Engdahl, The
Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 61 (1994).
United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). Jones & Laughlin Steel does
not address the concept of dual federalism, but it is rejected in Darby. Id. at 114.
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918), overruled in part by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (“The grant of authority over a
purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always
existing and carefully reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”).
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895).
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commerce among the several states is also exclusive.” 111 As it
summarized, “That which belongs to commerce is within the
jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state.”112
Of course, E.C. Knight was wrong about state power being exclusive
over federal power. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is
supreme over state law, but there is no similar rule with regard to state
law.113
Despite all of the limiting decisions as to Congress’ commerce
power during this period, the Court did not consistently rule against
Congress’ commerce power. During this period, many cases had the
shadings of the later more modern approach. During the same time
period that the Court limited Congress’ commerce power in E.C.
Knight and Hammer, the Court decided other cases that allowed for a
more expansive view of commerce power. The substantial effects test
has its origins in Southern Railway Company v. United States.114 A
111
112
113

114

Id.
Id. at 12.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (rejecting the doctrine). It is rejected again later in even
more forceful language. Id. at 123–24 (“Our conclusion is unaffected by
the Tenth Amendment which provides: ‘The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people’. The amendment states but a truism that all
is retained which has not been surrendered.”). See Edward S. Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950), for the most famous
discussion of the doctrine of dual federalism. Professor Corwin is given credit
for having coined the phrase “dual federalism.” Paul D. Moreno, “So Long As
Our System Shall Exist”: Myth, History, and the New Federalism, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 711 n.2 (2005). And he is said to have “famously
announced” its passing. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process
to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE
L.J. 1920, 1921 (2014). Professor Bulman-Pozen summarized Corwin’s
argument, “[H]e argued that the federal system had ‘shifted base in the direction
of a consolidated national power’ and wondered whether ‘the constituent States
of the System [could] be saved for any useful purpose.’” Id. (citations omitted).
But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (“It is incontestible
[sic] that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ Although
the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government,
they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”) (citations omitted).
Printz was referring only to the Court’s holding in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), that under the Tenth Amendment Congress could not
commandeer state or local agencies to enforce federal laws.
S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). In another case earlier in the
same year also cited by Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld a safety
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federal railway safety act as amended applied to all railroad cars, even
intrastate ones using an interstate rail line.115 In addressing whether the
act was constitutional, the Court said the issue was whether there was
“a real or substantial relation or connection” or a “close or direct
relation or connection” between intrastate traffic, and “the safety of
interstate commerce and of those who are employed in its
movement.”116 For the Court, the answer to this required no more than
“common knowledge”: “Both classes of traffic are at times carried in
the same car, and when this is not the case, the cars in which they are
carried are frequently commingled in the same train and in the
switching and other movements at terminals” that they are
“interdependent; for whatever brings delay or disaster to one, or results
in disabling one of its operatives, is calculated to impede the progress
and imperil the safety of other trains” and the lack of safety equipment
“is a menace not only to that train, but to others.”117
One of the most famous cases allowing for a more expansive view
of commerce power was the decision in The Shreveport Rate Cases118
where the Court indirectly upheld the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) 119 to regulate intrastate commerce

115

116

117
118
119

measure related to hours of employment. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1911). The act included in
its coverage employees whose work was strictly for intrastate commerce. Id. at
616. The railroad was undone by its own argument, that “the interstate and
intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so interwoven that it is utterly
impracticable for them to divide their employees” between interstate and
intrastate work. Id. at 618. Without giving any rationale, the Court held that the
interwoven operations confirmed that both were subject to Congress’ commerce
power: “Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and
property that are transported in that commerce, and of those who are employed
in transporting.” Id.
S. Ry. Co., 222 U.S. at 26 (“[I]t must be held that the original act, as enlarged by
the amendatory one, is intended to embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar
vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce.”).
Id. It is worth noting that the Court uses the modifier direct as synonymous with
a close relationship, not the direct/indirect metaphysical connection of other
cases.
Id. at 27.
The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
The ICC was the first administrative agency to regulate interstate commerce. See
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“It was not until 1887 with the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act that the interstate commerce power
began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important
federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman
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between cities within the same state.120 Borrowing from Gibbons, the
Court said that “Congress is empowered to regulate,-that is, to provide
the law for the government of interstate commerce”121 and parroting
McCulloch “to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection and
advancement.’”122 The Court previewing the substantial effects test of
Jones & Laughlin Steel, held that the ICC’s authority “necessarily
embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control
is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic.”123
The Court implicitly recognized that the ICC had the power to
order that the lower in-state rates be raised to be equal to the higher
ICC approved interstate rates.124

120

121
122
123

124

Anti-Trust Act and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S.
563, 582 (1922) (“The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, . . . was
enacted by Congress to prevent interstate railroad carriers from charging
unreasonable rates and from unjustly discriminating between persons and
localities.”).
The Texas railroads in the case were subject to regulation by the Texas Railroad
Commission for in-state rates and by the ICC for interstate rates. The Shreveport
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 346. The in-state rates were much cheaper. Illustrative,
the rate from Dallas, Texas for the 147.7 miles to Marshall, Texas near the
Louisiana border was 37 cents while the in-state rate from Shreveport, Louisiana
for the 42 miles to Marshall, Texas was 56 cents, over 50% higher for less than
1/3 the distance. Id. To prevent discriminatory pricing, the ICC ordered that the
interstate rate be lowered to be the same as the Texas in-state rate. Id. at 347.
Id. at 351.
Id. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
Id. It was argued that under its commerce power the ICC had no authority to
consider the in-state rate at all. The Court said, “It is of the essence of this power
that, where it exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or
impeded by the rivalries of local government.” Id. at 350.
See JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 140 (15th ed. 2017). The Court in R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi.,
B. & Q. R. Co. found that Congress had the commerce power to expand ICC
authority to regulate travel strictly within one state if it impacted interstate rates.
R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 590–91 (1922).
In the case, the Wisconsin rate for the intrastate portion of an interstate journey
was 2 cents per mile versus 3.6 cents for interstate travelers, cutting the
interstate railroad net income by $6,000,000. Id. at 578–80. Interstate travelers
going from Chicago to Madison, Wisconsin could buy an interstate ticket to
Madison or save money by buying an interstate ticket to Milwaukee, Wisconsin
and a cheaper intrastate ticket from Milwaukee to Madison. The basic holding
was that interstate travelers between Chicago and interior cities of Wisconsin
were paying an unfair portion of the cost of passenger travel and that the ICC
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V. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION—1937 AND THE
COMMERCE POWER EMERGES FROM ITS TWISTY DETOURS
In 1937, N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel125 along with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish 126 started a constitutional revolution. Both
cases rejected the Court’s earlier imposed limits on governmental
power, Jones & Laughlin Steel on congressional commerce power, and
West Coast Hotel on due process limits on state and federal power.
Cases like E.C. Knight and Hammer limited Congress’ commerce
power to regulate social and economic issues. A similar line of cases
imposed substantive due process limits on states and the federal
government to address social and economic issues. 127 Both the
Commerce Clause cases and substantive due process cases limiting
governmental powers were more about imposing a laissez-faire view
of government, federal or state, as to regulations of private business
then about commerce power or due process. The Court was open in the
post-1937 due process cases about how it had misused the Due Process
Clause in the past and the reason why it was adopting a different
approach going forward. 128 Jones & Laughlin Steel jettisoned the
heavy restrictions of the post-Gibbons cases without noting that they
too were likely manifestations of a similar laissez-faire philosophy.129

125
126
127
128

129

could increase the intrastate rate. The Court in Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co. referred to
its holding as to strictly intrastate commerce rates as “power already indirectly
exercised as to persons and localities, with approval of this court in the
Shreveport and other cases.” Id. at 584.
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)
(“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought. We emphasize again what Chief
Justice Waite said in Munn v. State of Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’” (citations
omitted)). In Williamson, the Court found that the state might have had a
conceivable justification for passing what was likely a needless wasteful
regulation of the sale of eyeglasses. Id. at 487–88.
Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez recognized the joint history behind both a
restrictive view of commerce power and an expansive view of due process
limits, “These restrictive views of commerce subject to congressional power
complemented the Court’s activism in limiting the enforceable scope of state
economic regulation. It is most familiar history that during this same period the
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Even putting aside the due process cases, there is little doubt that
1937 is a turning point in American history, unlike few others.
Congress went from being unable to regulate the economic
consequences of child labor to being able to regulate the minutest
aspects of our national economy. 130 The limiting pre-1937 cases
became as dead as prehistoric dinosaurs snuffed out by some meteor.
True, the fossils of cases like E.C. Knight and Hammer can still be
perceived,131 but they have as little real life in them as the etchings in
dry riverbeds. But it is equally intriguing that the revolution has had
little advancement, except for the rational basis test moving from

130

131

Court routinely invalidated state social and economic legislation under an
expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process . . . .
The fulcrums of judicial review in these cases were the notions of liberty and
property characteristic of laissez-faire economics, whereas the Commerce
Clause cases turned on what was ostensibly a structural limit of federal power,
but under each conception of judicial review the Court’s character for the first
third of the century showed itself in exacting judicial scrutiny of a legislature’s
choice of economic ends and of the legislative means selected to reach them. It
was not merely coincidental, then, that sea changes in the Court’s conceptions of
its authority under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses occurred virtually
together, in 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605–06 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart framed the issue as to child labor, “The
controlling question for decision is: Is it within the authority of Congress in
regulating commerce among the states to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce of manufactured goods . . .in which . . . children under the age of
fourteen have been employed or permitted to work.” Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 269 (1918). The Court’s answer was unequivocal, “To sustain this
statute . . . would sanction an invasion by the federal power of the control of a
matter purely local in its character, and over which no authority has been
delegated to Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the
states.” Id. at 276. Then just two years after Jones & Laughlin Steel in 1937, the
Court said, “The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary
and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.” N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).“The contention that in Commerce Clause cases the
courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a
rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest.” Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192–93 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Twenty-five years later in Katzenbach v. McClung,
federal commerce power was held to include barring racial discrimination by a
demonstrably local barbeque joint that had purchased $69,683 its meat from a
local supplier who had purchased it from outside the State. See Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
Justice Thomas alone regularly reminds us of the fossilized remains of E.C.
Knight.
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substantive due process cases to commerce power cases. In the due
process cases, the rational basis test is little changed from shortly after
West Coast Hotel.132
The constitutional revolution of 1937 was indeed a reemergence of
a broad view of federal commerce power. Giving detail to the
Affectation Doctrine of Gibbons, the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel
emphasized a “substantial effects” test to show how close intrastate
activities had to be before Congress had the power to regulate it under
their commerce power. The Court upheld the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”) of 1935 as being within Congress’ enumerated power
to regulate local activities affecting interstate commerce.133 The NLRA
required collective bargaining between the company and the
employee’s labor union as to activities affecting interstate
commerce. 134 Jones & Laughlin was a Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
company and the dispute primarily involved the company’s firing of
union representatives in its nearby Aliquippa, Pennsylvania plant.135
Jones & Laughlin argued that no interstate commerce was involved,
only a dispute as to relations and activities in its manufacturing
department. 136 The Court noted that Jones & Laughlin was “a self132

133

134

135

136

Since the first application of the rational basis test in Carolene Products, a year
after West Coast Hotel, the rational basis test has remained virtually unchanged.
But since that case, the Court has adopted a number of other tests for cases that
previously may have fallen within the rational basis test. Strict scrutiny for free
speech and race classifications likely had their origin before Carolene Products,
but the higher level of review for classifications based upon gender, alienage,
and illegitimacy all would have been subject to the rational basis test in 1937.
The fundamental rights other than free speech are also post-1937 in origin.
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (noting that the
NLRA involved the Affectation Doctrine: “The critical words of this provision,
prescribing the limits of the Board’s authority in dealing with the labor
practices, are ‘affecting commerce.’”). The NLRA prevented any person from
engaging in unfair labor practices “affecting commerce.” Id. at 30. Commerce
was defined as any “trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication”
between any states or foreign countries. Id. at 31. “[A]ffecting commerce,” the
Act said, meant “burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce.” Id.
See id. at 24 (“The Board is empowered to prevent the described unfair labor
practices affecting commerce and the act prescribes the procedure to that end.”).
See id. at 28 (“Practically all the factual evidence in the case, except that which
dealt with the nature of respondent’s business, concerned its relations with the
employees in the Aliquippa plant whose discharge was the subject of the
complaint.”).
Jones & Laughlin Steel’s emphasis was that its Aliquippa plant was a selfcontained operation for making iron and steel products from raw materials. Id. at
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contained, highly integrated body” that drew “raw materials from
Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania in part through
arteries and by means controlled by [Jones & Laughlin].”137 In simple
terms, a labor dispute in Aliquippa would substantially affect
commerce all the way from Minnesota to the coal mines of West
Virginia and the states in between, and that in the final analysis was all
the Court required.
Before discussing the substantial effects test, it is important to see
the approaches discarded by the Court. First, the Court dismissed the
need to apply the stream of commerce test, 138 saying that it was
enough that there was a “close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce.”139 Relying on E.C. Knight,140 the company claimed that
no interstate commerce was involved. Citing Stafford and its progeny,
the government sought to distinguish the E.C. Knight line of cases by
urging “that these activities constitute a ‘stream’ or ‘flow’ of
commerce, of which the Aliquippa manufacturing plant is the focal
point, and that industrial strife at that point would cripple the entire
movement.”141 The Court refused to take the bait, saying that being in
the stream of commerce was only one type of commerce power case,
the better approach being whether the federal law bore a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. 142 The Court seemed not to be

137
138
139
140

141
142

27. It argued that “the industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing
department of respondent’s enterprise are not subject to federal regulation. The
argument rests upon the proposition that manufacturing in itself is not
commerce.” Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 36).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39. A whole line of cases supporting this claim have been omitted. Later,
E.C. Knight was separately considered by the Court.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36–37 (“We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of
defendant’s business dispose of the asserted analogy to the ‘stream of
commerce’ cases. The instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power which the
government invokes in support of the present act. The congressional authority to
protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a ‘flow’ of interstate
or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action
springing from other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power to
regulate commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its
‘protection or advancement.’” (citations omitted)).
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tempted in the least by the government’s reliance on the stream of
commerce cases, preferring a straight-forward substantial effects
approach:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.143
Second, the Court acknowledged the direct/indirect test144 but said that
whether something was direct or indirect was a matter of degree,
decided by a practical factual evaluation. The Court recognized the
series of cases where local activities had obviously impacted interstate
commerce, but the cases had found that the impact was “indirect” as
opposed to “direct.” The Court paid homage to those cases, saying that
there had to be some limit on our federalist form of government, that
federal power to regulate the effects of local activities on interstate
commerce should not be “so indirect and remote” that it obliterated the
difference between local and federal government.145 Then in one short
sentence, the Court changed the direct/indirect test from some mystical
mumble jumble to an exercise of practical reality: “The question is
necessarily one of degree.”146 Later picking up that theme, it said that
to call a disruption of the steel business by a strike “indirect or remote”
disregarded that such a stoppage “would have a most serious effect
upon interstate commerce,” that it was obvious that “it would be
immediate and might be catastrophic.” 147 In calling these effects
indirect, the Court said, “We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest
facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and
143
144

145

146
147

Id. at 37.
Id. at 31–32 (“It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of
the congressional power. . . . Whether or not particular action does affect
commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to federal
control . . . is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise.”).
Id. at 37. Three times the Court equates a direct impact with “a close and
intimate” impact, a seemingly closer relationship than the prevailing substantial
effect test but if it meant the phrase to be more protective, it did not carry the
day. Id. at 32, 37, 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 41.
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indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.”148 In then the deathblow to
the old direct/indirect test, it concluded, “We have often said that
interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true
that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a
judgment that does not ignore actual experience.”149 In applying the
Court’s substantial effects test, any impact on interstate commerce was
to be based upon a practical real-life factual evaluation, not based upon
some metaphysical concept of direct versus indirect.150
Third, the Court minimized E.C. Knight’s holding that
manufacturing was not commerce. Citing other federal antitrust cases,
the Court said that the defense’s reliance upon E.C. Knight “have been
so necessarily and expressly decided to be unsound as to cause the
contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express
notice.”151 It is not that the Court reversed E.C. Knight’s holding that
manufacturing was not commerce, but rather that it did not matter if it
was commerce or not. If the manufacturing substantially affected
interstate commerce, it was subject to the federal commerce power.152
148

149
150

151
152

Id. More specifically, the Court did not turn blind eye of the impact on interstate
commerce of nationally integrated companies, “When industries organize
themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the
dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial
labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter
when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing
consequences of industrial war?” Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (“If the production by
one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and
actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect
does not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of
men employed, or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by
all combined.”).
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 39.
In Justice Thomas’ defense of the E.C. Knight case and its progeny, he
disagrees, “If federal power extended to these types of production
‘comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state
control.’” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598 (1995) (citations omitted)
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232,
(1921) (“It is settled . . . that the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture,
manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not
suffice to subject them to the control of Congress”). “Whether or not
manufacturing, agriculture, or other matters substantially affected interstate
commerce was irrelevant.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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It cannot be overemphasized what a game changer Jones &
Laughlin Steel was. 153 McCulloch had only required that means to
accomplish enumerated powers be “appropriate.” Gibbons had said
that intrastate commerce must “affect” interstate commerce. The
intervening tests varied from the hostile in E.C. Knight and Hammer to
the practical in Southern Railway and The Shreveport Rate Cases to
the metaphysical in Carter and Butler. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the
Court ignored Hammer, minimized the stream of commerce cases,
distinguished E.C. Knight, and reframed the direct/indirect test into the
substantial effects test, the first meaningful test for Congress’ power to
regulate intrastate commerce or any other local activity affecting
interstate commerce.
The Court was respectful of the concern for our federalist
system154 but did not mention the dual federalism doctrine per se. As
to the line between too much power for the central government and too
little, the Court was subtle if not coy: “The question is necessarily one
of degree.”155 It thought that Southern Railway and, with the exception
of E.C. Knight, many of the antitrust cases supported the view that
intrastate activities with a “close and intimate relation to interstate
commerce” 156 was subject to federal control. Its position could not
have been clearer: “[I]f Congress deems certain recurring practices
though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct,
restrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national
supervision and restraint.”157
The key to the substantial effects test is that it is a practical one,158
one not dependent upon the manipulations of the stream of commerce
153

154

155
156
157

158

Justice Kennedy says it simply, “The case that seems to mark the Court’s
definitive commitment to the practical conception of the commerce power
is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . . .” Id. at 573 (citations omitted)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37 (1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope
of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government.”).
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 40 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 408 (1922)).
In summing up the fact-based nature of its inquiry, the Court concluded,
“[I]nterstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that
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cases, the vagaries of the direct/indirect test, or the fallacies of dual
federalism. As the Court said, “In view of respondent’s far-flung
activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It
is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”159
The impact on interstate commerce was not to be decided “in an
intellectual vacuum.” 160 The Court minced no words in rejecting a
laissez-faire view of government power, “When industries organize
themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate
commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be
maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden
field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial
war?”161

159
160
161

interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not
ignore actual experience.” Id. at 41–42. The following year in another N.L.R.B.
case, the Court summarized its holding in Jones & Laughlin Steel, “The question
that must be faced under the act upon particular facts is whether the unfair labor
practices involved have such a close and substantial relation to the freedom of
interstate commerce from injurious restraint that these practices may
constitutionally be made the subject of federal cognizance through provisions
looking to the peaceable adjustment of labor disputes.” Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 467 (1938).
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41.
Id.
Id. Just two years later, the Court said that national scale was not determinative.
See N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939) (“Nor do we think it
important, as respondents seem to argue, that the volume of the commerce here
involved, though substantial, was relatively small as compared with that in the
cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act which have hitherto
engaged our attention. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is
plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.”). Fainblatt, a
New Jersey operation, made women’s sports garment out of fabrics sent from
New York and returned to New York dealers or directly to customers in other
states. Id. at 602–03. The Fainblatt case introduced the concept of class or
aggregate impact. Though businesses like Fainblatt had an average of only thitytwo employees, the women’s clothing industry consisted of over 3,414
businesses and ranked ninth in number of workers employed nationally. Id. at
608 n.2.
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VI. APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST
The first key case following Jones & Laughlin Steel was United
States v. Darby.162 Darby did not advance the substantial effects test to
any significant degree, but it did some important clean-up work. Darby
involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The FLSA based its
regulation of minimum wages and maximum hours on two different
aspects of the federal commerce power. In 1938 when the FLSA was
passed, Congress was still uncertain as to the scope of its power to
regulate interstate commerce, so it sought to use both its power over
things in interstate commerce and its power to regulate local activities
affecting interstate commerce. Section 1 163 made “unlawful the
shipment in interstate commerce of any goods” made in violation of
the acts wage and hour provisions. 164 Section 2 made unlawful the
violation of the act as to “employees engaged in production of goods
for commerce.”165
Fred W. Darby operated a lumber company in Georgia using raw
material from Georgia but shipping much of the finished lumber to
other states. He paid his employees less than the then twenty-five cents
minimum wage in violation of the Act. The lower court had found the
FLSA unconstitutional on the basis of the Hammer case. The Court
162

163
164

165

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Falling between Jones & Laughlin
Steel and Darby was Currin v. Wallace, where the Court upheld against an
enumerated powers challenge the Tobacco Inspection Act of August 23, 1935.
See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939). The Act allowed federal inspection of
tobacco at tobacco auctions one hour prior to the sell, some of the tobacco
intended for interstate and foreign commerce, some not. See id. at 11 (“Here, the
transactions on the tobacco market were conducted indiscriminately at virtually
the same time, and in a manner which made it necessary, if the congressional
rule were to be applied, to make it govern all the tobacco thus offered for sale.”).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 45 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1) (repealed 1994).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 110. After Darby, there are no discernable limits on
Congress ability to regulate goods moving in interstate commerce.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 45 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2) (repealed 1994). Unlike
much federal legislation, which required that the Court or some administrative
agency, such as the N.L.R.B. in Jones & Laughlin Steel, find that some local
activity affected interstate commerce, the FLSA specifically found that
violations of the wage and hour by businesses producing goods for shipment in
interstate commerce did affect interstate commerce. As the Darby court points
out, earlier acts, such as the Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act
had also made similar findings. Darby, 312 U.S. at 120. This aspect of Darby
became important in the first round of the rational basis cases as represented by
Katzenbach v. McClung.
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reversed Hammer. 166 Section 1 was premised entirely on Congress’
power to regulate goods in commerce, “While manufacture is not of
itself interstate commerce the shipment of manufactured goods
interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by
Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”167 Regulation
of goods in commerce knew of no limits: “The power of Congress
over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed by the constitution.’” 168 If it was interstate commerce,
Congress could regulate it. There is no clearer form of federal
commerce power. 169 Any motive of Congress to use interstate
commerce as a cover for regulating some local activity was
irrelevant.170 The fact that the federal law might interfere with local
police power was meaningless: “It is no objection to the assertion of
the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended
166

167
168
169

170

Darby, 312 U.S. at 116 (“The distinction on which the [Hammer] decision was
rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to
articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious property—a
distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any provision of
the Constitution—has long since been abandoned.”).
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
Whether merely crossing state lines should always bring into play federal
commerce power is an issue worthy of discussion, but it is beyond the scope of
this article which involves Congress’ ability to regulate activity that does not
cross state lines. The issue was raised in N.L.R.B. v. White Swan Co., but the
case was resolved on procedural grounds. N.L.R.B. v. White Swan Co., 313
U.S. 23, 26 (1941) (“Where a local business, such as a laundry, is located in a
city on a state line, and is not engaged in interstate commerce, except in so far as
it may collect articles to be serviced and may make deliveries to customers
living across the state line, is such business, by reason of such collections and
deliveries, deemed engaged in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of [the NLRA]
so that an unfair labor practice on its part would be an unfair labor practice
‘affecting commerce’ . . . .”). For an argument that Congress power to regulate
things crossing state lines goes too far, see Barry Friedman & Genevieve
Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the Commerce Power,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 290 (2012) (“In short, the reasoning of these cases
became strained and completely formalistic. The mere fact that a good or a
person crossed a state line was deemed sufficient to give Congress the power to
ban it.”).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (“Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state
power merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use
of articles of commerce within the states of destination and is not prohibited
unless by other Constitutional provisions.”).
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by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of
the states.”171
As for Section 2, “with respect to all employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce,” since the employees
were not actually engaged in interstate commerce, the issue was
whether the production was “so related to the commerce and so affects
it as to be within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it.”172
The Court said, starting with McCulloch and Gibbons that Congress’
power extended “to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.”173 The Court rejected the fallacy of E.C. Knight,
that since local activity was within the scope of state power, it could
not be regulated by Congress: “In the absence of Congressional
legislation on the subject state laws which are not regulations of the
commerce itself or its instrumentalities are not forbidden even though
they affect interstate commerce. But it does not follow that Congress
may not by appropriate legislation regulate intrastate activities where
they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”174 Other than
shortening the Jones & Laughlin Steel phrase from “close and
substantial” to just “a substantial effect,” the Darby case does not
expand the test. Darby did go beyond Jones & Laughlin Steel in
defending the test’s constitutional validity. The Darby court said, “But
long before the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act, this
171

172
173
174

Id. This language, despite its sparseness, is in effect a rejection of the doctrine of
dual federalism. But if there was any doubt about the Court’s meaning, Darby
explicitly rejected the dual federalism doctrine. Id. at 124 (“The [tenth]
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.”); see Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,
219–20 (1938) (“It does not follow, however, because these operations of the
utilities are of vast concern to the people of the City and State of New York, that
they do not also involve the interests of interstate and foreign commerce in such
a degree that the Federal Government was entitled to intervene for their
protection.”); see also Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S 1, 11–12 (1939) (“Congress is
not to be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority in prescribing
regulations merely because these may have the quality of police regulations.”).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119 (citations omitted). This holding is a further rejection of dual
federalism. Just because something fell within state power did not preclude
federal power.

228

UMass Law Review

v. 14 | 182

Court had many times held that the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative
action of activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the
commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.” 175
Darby also mentioned the importance of the class or aggregate impact
of smaller business on interstate commerce, which becomes a key to
modern commerce power.176
Perhaps the most maligned substantial effects case was Wickard v.
Filburn.177 Wickard upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”)
175

176

177

Id. at 119–20. Darby’s original contribution to this debate was with respect to
other enumerated powers: “Congress . . . may choose the means reasonably
adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control
of intrastate activities. Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to
powers, other than the commerce power granted to the national government,
when the means chosen, although not themselves within the granted power,
were nevertheless deemed appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some
purpose within an admitted power of the national government.” Id. at 121.
Examples included the Lever Act passed during World I that allowed the
President to limit the use of food additives in the manufacture of beer, which
was found within the War Powers. See Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S.
264 (1920). A federal ban on the prescribing of “intoxicating malt liquors for
medicinal purposes” was found within the enumerated power under Section 2 of
the Eighteenth Amendment to pass “appropriate legislation” as to the prohibition
of alcoholic beverages in Section 1 of the Eighteenth Amendment. See James
Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 554 (1924). A more obtuse citation
was Westfall v. United States, which found that a crime involving a state bank
fell within the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S.
256 (1927). The case itself does not deal with whether the Federal Reserve
Board itself fell within any enumerated power. See generally McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123 (“Congress [in the FLSA] has made no distinction as
to the volume or amount of shipments in the commerce or of production for
commerce by any particular shipper or producer. It recognized that in present
day industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole and that the total
effect of the competition of many small producers may be great. The legislation
aimed at a whole embraces all its parts.” (citations omitted)).
The case of Wickard v. Filburn has become the shibboleth for overreaching
federal power. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Mr. Filburn was
subject to a financial penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all. Id. at 114–
15. The penalty was actually far more severe because the crop could not be sold
without a compliance certificate. See id. At 60 pounds per bushel, this would be
14,340 pounds too much wheat, almost 3 1/2 truckloads in a Ford F250. See
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674 (1995)
(Professor Merritt frames it humorously by quoting from her law school student
musical spoof sung to the tune of “Convoy.” “His name was farmer Filburn, we
looked in on his wheat sales. We caught him exceeding his quota. A criminal
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of 1938 that fixed a quota on the acreage and the amount of various
commodities that a farmer could grow.178 As for Farmer Filburn, he
planted twenty-three acres producing 462 bushels of wheat,
considerably over his allotted eleven acres and an excess of 239
bushels of wheat. The AAA went beyond the FLSA in Darby in that
Darby involved lumber either in commerce or intended for interstate
transportation, while Wickard involved wheat grown on Farmer
Filburn’s farm primarily intended for consumption on his farm by his
animals and his family. 179 There was no evidence that any part of

178

179

hard as nails. He said, ‘I don’t sell none interstate.’ I said, ‘That don’t mean cow
flop. We think you’re affecting commerce.’ And I set fire to his crop, HOT
DAMN! Cause we got interstate commerce Ain’t no where to run! We gone
regulate you That’s how we have fun. You made a call last Thursday long
distance to Bayonne. We gone put you out of business, an’ disconnect your
phone. COMMERCE!”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971)
(“Decisions which followed [Gibbons] departed from that view; but by the time
of United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filburn, the broader view of the
Commerce Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored.”
(citations omitted)); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552
(2012) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) (“Wickard has long
been regarded as ‘perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity,’ . . . .”). But see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (“Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress
may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general
regulation of state or private activities. The Court has said only that where a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence.”).
See United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1957) (“As
announced
in Wickard
v.
Filburn,
the
general
purpose
of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, insofar as it relates to wheat, is to control
production in order to avoid the problems resulting from deficits or surpluses. In
furtherance of this objective, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to establish
a national acreage allotment for each successive wheat crop, which, in turn, is
apportioned among the farms of the nation.” (citations omitted)).
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. Farmer Filburn’s practice was “to sell a portion of
the crop,” but the rest was used “to feed part to poultry and livestock on the
farm,” “in making flour for home consumption,” and “the rest for the following
seeding.” Id. In an earlier challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the
Court, using the stream of commerce fiction, found the case within Congress’
ability to regulate things in commerce. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47
(1939) (“The statute does not purport to control production. It sets no limit upon
the acreage which may be planted or produced and imposes no penalty for the
planting and producing of tobacco in excess of the marketing quota. It purports
to be solely a regulation of interstate commerce, which it reaches and affects at
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Farmer Filburn’s excess wheat had moved or was ever intended to
move in interstate commerce.180 The Court readily acknowledged that
Congress was pushing the envelope, “Even today, when this power has
been held to have great latitude, there is no decision of this Court that
such activities may be regulated where no part of the product is
intended for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects
thereof.”181
Despite Wickard’s criticism, reading Justice Jackson opinion in
Wickard is a textbook example of lucidity of reasoning and writing
after the long historical slug through cases like E.C. Knight and
Hammer. It is like waking up from a horrible dream. In one recurring
dream I have, I am helping to herd sheep into a corral, but they keep
escaping from a back gate, and no one will listen to me. In Wickard,
all the back gates are closed. 182 Every law professor has his own
hypothetical, often involving vegetables from someone’s backyard
garden, 183 to emphasize Wickard’s overreach. Wickard is criticized
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181

182

183

the throat where tobacco enters the stream of commerce,—the marketing
warehouse.”).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. There was actually no evidence as what was to be
done with the crop from his excess acreage. Id. (“The intended disposition of the
crop here involved has not been expressly stated.”). It is worth noting that
Wickard does not cite to Jones & Laughlin Steel, that Darby is its benchmark
case. Id. at 118. The Court does, however, quote the “close and substantial”
relationship language as found in the Shreveport Rate Cases. Id. at 123.
Id. at 120. It was enough under the act that it was “available for marketing.” Id.
at 119. There was no requirement that “any part of the wheat either within or
without the quota is sold or intended to be sold.” Id.
See id. at 124–25. The Court rejected the E.C. Knight open gate around the
Commerce Clause, “Whether the subject of the regulation in question was
‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not material for
purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us.” Id. at 124. The
direct/indirect back gate was also closed, “But even if appellee’s activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” Id. at 125.
Justice O’Connor seemed to reject this legal trope. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 51 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Wickard, then, did not extend
Commerce Clause authority to something as modest as the home cook’s herb
garden.”). Perhaps because of my long career in Malibu, California, my go to
hypothetical involves the federal government’s regulating avocado seeds
germinating in a glass jar secured by three strategically placed toothpicks, not
one of these seeds having ever verifiably survived to actually grow into a
producing tree. See generally Will Brokaw, Growing an Avocado Tree From a
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because no goods ever actually move in interstate commerce, and
because the most de minimis of grain was said to impact the interstate
and foreign price of wheat. Although not the first case to use the
concept, Wickard is usually associated with the use of the class or
aggregate impact doctrine to satisfy the substantial effects test.184 In
Wickard, the facts are persuasive that the class impact of homegrown
and home-consumed wheat on the price of interstate and foreign
commerce was substantial, if not dramatic.
The demonization of Wickard as judicial overreach is unjustified.
There were ample facts supporting the Court’s decision. Unlike in
other Commerce Clause cases where the Court has taken judicial
notice of facts supporting the substantial impact on interstate
commerce, 185 in Wickard the opposing parties had “stipulated a
summary of the economics of the wheat industry.”186 Three key facts
emerged. First, the interstate commerce in wheat was “large and
important.”187 Second, there was a large international market in wheat
that much impacted interstate commerce. 188 Third, homegrown and
home-consumed wheat was far from a trivial factor in the market. The
Court said that the consumption of homegrown wheat “constitutes the

184

185

186
187

188

Seed,
http://www.willsavocados.com/index.php/grow-avocado-tree
[https://perma.cc/PJ8N-Y29D] (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (“Ungrafted” trees
(like those grown inside from seeds) rarely produce fruit.”).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012)
(“Congress’s power, moreover, is not limited to regulation of an activity that by
itself substantially affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activities that
do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others.” (citing Wickard,
317 U.S. at 127–128)).
See e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964)
(“While the Act as adopted carried no congressional findings the record of its
passage through each house is replete with evidence of the burdens that
discrimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce.”); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (“Here, of course, Congress had included
no formal findings. But their absence is not fatal to the validity of the statute, for
the evidence presented at the hearings fully indicated the nature and effect of the
burdens on commerce which Congress meant to alleviate.” (citations omitted)).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
Id. Its problems were national in scope. Id. (“Although wheat is raised in every
state but one, production in most states is not equal to consumption.”).
Id. (“Largely as a result of increased foreign production and import restrictions,
annual exports of wheat and flour from the United States during the ten-year
period ending in 1940 averaged less than 10 per cent of total production, while
during the 1920’s they averaged more than 25 per cent.”).
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most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop,”189 that it
had a variability factor of 20%.190 The bottom line is that when the
price of wheat was high, farmers sold it in the interstate and foreign
markets. When it was cheap, they fed it to their livestock and made
flour for home consumption.191
The class or aggregate impact of homegrown and home-consumed
wheat could hardly be more obvious. On the other hand, the impact of
Farmer Filburn’s 239 extra bushels would be like a grain of sand
compared with the total production of wheat in the United States.192 It
is hard to argue with the fact that in determining whether any
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce, that the
aggregate impact of the class of like activities has to be considered.
That is surely the basis of all legislation. There might be little harm in
ignoring a stop sign in some distant point in the wheat fields of Kansas
with visibility in all directions, but if widely ignored, there would be
traffic chaos. Wickard was not the first case to use the aggregate or
class impact test, but it still remains its most famous example. The
Court’s finding that the class or aggregate impact of all homegrown
home-consumed wheat had enough of an impact on interstate
commerce seems supported by the facts.
Interestingly, the Court nowhere mentions Jones & Laughlin Steel
but rather emphasized the holding of The Shreveport Rate Cases in
1914, that intrastate rates could be revised “because of the economic
effects which they had upon interstate commerce,”193 that local matters
having “a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic”194 were
subject to federal power. Justice Jackson also quoted then current
189
190
191

192

193
194

Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 128 (“But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the
man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open
market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.”).
See
Wheat
Facts,
NAT’L
ASS’N
OF
WHEAT
GROWERS,
https://www.wheatworld.org/wheat-101/wheat-facts/ [https://perma.cc/FN9L5GZY] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (“In 2008/2009, U.S. farmers grew nearly
2.4 billion bushels of wheat on 63 million acres of land”); see also Top Wheat
Producing Countries, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/topwheat-producing-countries.html [https://perma.cc/9JLQ-RS7L] (last visited
Mar. 21, 2019) (stating that the United States is currently fourth in wheat
production trailing (3) Russia, (2) India and (1) China).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123.
Id. (quoting the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914)).
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Chief Justice Stone’s description of federal power in the 1942 case of
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Company:
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to
the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends
to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress
over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
effective execution of the granted power to regulate
interstate commerce. . . . Hence the reach of that power
extends to those intrastate activities which in a
substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise
of the granted power.195
The quoted test is an interesting one in that Chief Justice Stone
referred to regulating local activities as an “appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end,”196 which as discussed later, is close to
a rational basis test. Of course, Stone also refers to the substantial
effects test. Finally, Wickard itself concludes in the language of the
substantial effects test,
The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory
function quite as definitely as prohibitions or
restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt
that Congress may properly have considered that wheat
consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside
the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect
in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate
trade therein at increased prices.197
The case most representing the overreach of commerce power is not
Wickard but the 1971 case Perez v. United States. 198 In Perez,
Congress made loan sharking a federal crime subject to as much as

195

196

197
198

Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942)). The Court in Wrightwood held that Congress could regulate the local
sale of milk because it competed with milk shipped interstate. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 125.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (where Chief Justice Stone
first used this framing of the test).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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twenty years in prison. 199 Unlike what is common with regard to
federal criminal statutes, there was no “jurisdictional peg” 200 to tie
loan sharking to the channels of interstate commerce or to any effect
on interstate commerce. 201 Congress did include a declaration of
199

200

201

See United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1074 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The statute
was enacted as Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 and
amended Title 18 of the United States Code by adding Chapter 42, sections 891–
96, which deal with ‘Extortionate Credit Transactions.’”).
See id. at 1075. Jurisdictional peg is a common concept, not actually dealing
with jurisdiction but with Congress’ specifically tying a law to its commerce
power. Jurisdictional peg is the phrase used by the Second Circuit in the opinion
in Perez. Id. (“We will concede at the outset that almost all federal criminal
statutes are so drafted that the connection with federal interests—the federal
jurisdictional peg—must be proved in each case because such connection is
incorporated into the definition of the offense.”). As examples of jurisdictional
pegs, the lower court in Perez mentioned the Hobbs Act (“obstructing or
affecting interstate commerce or movements of commodities in commerce by
robbery or extortion”), the Interstate Communications Act (“ . . . transmitting
kidnapping or extortion threats by means of interstate commerce”), and an
interstate prostitution act (“transporting women in interstate commerce for
prostitution, etc.”). Id. at 1075, 1075 n.1. See also Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d
1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a ‘jurisdictional hook’ (i.e., limitation) that would
limit the reach of the statute to a discrete set of cases that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”). The Supreme Court in Perez mentions as an example of
protecting against the misuse of the channels of interstate commerce one of the
more interesting examples of the use of jurisdictional pegs, the Lindberg Act
passed after the kidnapping of the Lindberg baby. The Lindberg Act had a threepart jurisdictional peg, (1) either that the kidnapped victim “is willfully
transported in interstate or foreign commerce,” (2) the kidnapper “travels in
interstate or foreign commerce” or (3) that the kidnapper “uses the mail or any
means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1) (2006). The Supreme Court mentions two other jurisdictional pegs
as examples of protecting instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the
destruction of an aircraft “used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce,”, and theft from interstate shipments “in interstate or
foreign commerce.” Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006); 18
U.S.C. § 659 (2012)).
Perez categorized the commerce power cases: “The Commerce Clause reaches,
in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate
or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for example,
the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been kidnaped. Second,
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as for example, the
destruction of an aircraft, or persons or things in commerce, as, for example,
thefts from interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is
with this last category that we are here concerned.” Perez, 402 U.S. at 150
(citations omitted). This three-part category is widely used by the Supreme
Court but in the more common form found in Lopez. See United States v. Lopez,
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“Findings and purpose” to the Act, which stated that, “Organized
crime is interstate and international in character” involving “billions of
dollars each year,” and that much of that illicit income “is generated
by extortionate credit transactions,” that is, loan sharking.202 Further,
the findings continued, loan sharking was both carried out using
interstate and foreign commerce “to a substantial extent” and even
when strictly intrastate, “they nevertheless directly affect interstate and
foreign commerce.”203
But the law did not require the trial court to find any interstate
activities to make it a federal crime.204 To compound the problem, the
actual crime in Perez could hardly have been more local in nature.
Perez, apparently a New Yorker, had loaned $3,000 to a New York
City butcher to build a local butcher shop. The butcher had attempted
but failed to get more conventional financing. The only even remote
reference to the broader world of loan sharking was that Perez
“threatened [the butcher] with hospitalization, harm to his family, the
attention of persons higher in the moneylending chain, as well as an
ominous ‘or else,’ if repayments should not be promptly
forthcoming.”205 It was enough for the federal crime that Perez was a
loan shark, which he undoubtedly was. Other than Perez’ assertion that
he might bring the unpaid loan to “the attention of persons higher in
the moneylending chain,” there was no evidence that Perez had any
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203

204

205

514 U.S. 549, 588–89 (1995). Only the third category is emphasized in this
article.
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat.
146, 159 (1968).
The findings also mentioned that loan sharking had an adverse impact on the
Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy power being an alternative federal enumerated
power. Id.
18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (“An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of
credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor
at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make
repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause
harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.”). Indeed, no part of
the actual law referenced any aspect of interstate commerce. But see Perez, 426
F.2d at 1082 (“The statute here questioned is unprecedented in making a federal
crime of conduct related to interstate commerce only by an assumed effect on
such commerce. In all previous federal criminal statutes proof of some specific
connection with interstate commerce such as movement across state lines or the
use of some instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as the mails, has been
required.” (Hays, J., dissenting)).
Perez, 426 F.2d at 1074.
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association with organized crime or any other interstate connections,
but that hardly mattered. No part of the law required any connection to
interstate commerce, and no part of the transaction involved interstate
commerce.206
The Court’s emphasis in Perez was the class or aggregate impact,
“Petitioner is clearly a member of the class which engages in
‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress and the
description of that class has the required definiteness.” 207 After
discussing Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, but without
mentioning the rational basis test for which those cases are
noteworthy, it picked up the class impact theme again, “In emphasis of
our position that it was the class of activities regulated that was the
measure, we acknowledged that Congress appropriately considered the
‘total incidence’ of the practice on commerce.”208 And then concluded,
“Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial,
individual instances’ of the class.”209
The Court then followed this up with a series of conclusions:
“Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the
judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce.” 210 It continued,
“The findings by Congress are quite adequate on that
ground.” 211 Congressional hearings showed that “The loan shark
racket provides organized crime with its second most lucrative source
of revenue, exacts millions from the pockets of people, coerces its
victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the
takeover by racketeers of legitimate businesses.” 212 And finally, far
from being just a local crime, “Loan sharking in its national setting is
one way organized interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the
206

207
208
209
210

211
212

See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971) (interpreting the possession
portion of the federal law making it a crime for a felon “who receives, possesses,
or transports in commerce or affecting commerce,” to require the government to
show some connection to interstate commerce). The Court in Bass reserved the
question as to whether the commerce power required such a connection. See
generally id.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971).
Id. at 154 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. This is the closest Perez comes to mentioning or applying the rational basis
test.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
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poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from numerous localities to
finance its national operations.”213 Although the Perez majority did not
mention the rational basis test, this use of congressional hearings to
justify the claimed impact on interstate commerce is reminiscent of the
use of committee hearings in rational basis due process cases.214
There are two difficulties with the Perez opinion. First, the class or
aggregate impact reasoning does not work. There was no showing that
Perez was part of any out of state or organized crime syndicate.215 An
impact of zero can be multiplied by infinity, and it is still zero. Justice
Stewart, the lone dissenter, framed it well; “But under the statute
before us a man can be convicted without any proof of interstate
movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of
facts showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce.” 216
Second, there is nothing about the crime of loan sharking that
distinguishes it from all other crimes. Why was there a need to define
prostitution in terms of interstate travel if supporting organized crime
was enough to fall within Congress’ commerce power?217 Here again,
Justice Stewart hit it on the head, “But it is not enough to say that loan
sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem . . .
And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on
interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate
business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or
violence in the streets.”218
Because Wickard involved a measly extra 239 bushels of
homegrown and home-consumed wheat, it seems to exemplify
213
214

215

216
217

218

Id. at 157.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (relying
largely on congressional hearings). In Carolene Products, the seminal due
process case, the Court stated that “The Filled Milk Act was adopted by
Congress after committee hearings, in the course of which eminent scientists and
health experts testified.” Id.
See Perez, 402 U.S. at 147–48. The Supreme Court facts say that Miranda, a
butcher, obtained an extortionist loan of $3,000 from Perez, both borrower and
lender presumably from New York but neither residency is actually stated. See
id. The Court mentions a threat of Perez to turn the collection over “to people
who would not be nice but who would put him in the hospital if he did not pay”
but that threat also contained no reference to out-of-state residency. See id.
Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317–18 (1913) (considering the
constitutionality of a law that forbade the transportation of a woman in interstate
commerce for the purpose of prostitution).
Perez, 402 U.S. at 157–58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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commerce power overreach. But the class impact in Wickard was
undeniable, a 20% variable in what was a volatile international market.
Perez involved organized crime’s second most leading source of
income, so the impact on interstate commerce seems obvious beyond
comment. But Perez loaned $3,000 to a local butcher, all aspects
occurring in New York City, and however brutal Perez’ threats were, it
is hard to see the federal interest.219 No matter the pot of money going
to organized crime across the country, there was no evidence tying
Perez to any part of that national class or aggregate impact.220
Furthermore, in Wickard, only the federal government had the
power to control the supply of wheat in the international and national
market.221 Any individual state could have regulated only the wheat in
that state. In Perez on the other hand, New York State would have had
the ability to prosecute Perez for his threat of physical violence against
the New York City butcher. There was absolutely no need for the
federal government to step into the case, further congesting federal
courts with what were essentially local crimes. 222 Unlike something
like the Lindberg Act, which criminalized the transportation of a
kidnap victim across interstate lines,223 where any one state authority
219

220

221

222

223

See United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1083 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hays, J.,
dissenting). The opinion in the Second Circuit was no more helpful as to any
out-of-state connection, but the dissenting Justice Hays summarized the case,
“Here Congress has sought to use the Commerce Clause as a basis for criminal
sanctions on purely local activity.” Id.
See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (suggesting an alternative
explanation for Perez is that it would have been too difficult to prove the federal
crime if some actual connection to organized crime was required).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125–26 (1942). The marketing of wheat was
international in scope, with Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States
being the four largest exporters. Id. In stipulations by the parties, it was revealed
that wheat was raised in all but one. Id. at 125. Sixteen states had a surplus of
wheat, and thirty-two states and the District of Columbia produced less than
they consumed. Id.
The lower court in Perez stated that Congress in its findings refuted that
organized crime was a subject more appropriate for the states. Perez, 426 F.2d at
1080 (“The legislative history also shows recognition by Congress that the states
alone cannot control organized crime, including loan-sharking, while federal
efforts are better able to do so.” (footnote omitted)).
See United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The
Federal Kidnapping Act was enacted by Congress to stem an increasing tide
of interstate kidnappings and to curb an epidemic of criminals who purposely
took advantage of the lack of coordination among state law enforcement
agencies.”). The Federal Kidnapping Act currently provides: “(a) Whoever
unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away
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might have trouble following, federal power did not enhance in any
way the prosecution of Perez. Even assuming that loan sharking was
the national problem that the government claimed, that could have
been addressed by funding state programs addressing the issue. There
was no need for the federal government to involve itself in what was
every way a local issue. Perez, not Wickard, is the poster child of
federal overreach.
VII. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST BECOMES PART OF THE
COMMERCE POWER
Nothing seems to be more local than racism, but Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States224 found that racial discrimination by places of
accommodation against persons traveling interstate rationally related
to interstate commerce and was subject to federal regulation.
Katzenbach v. McClung225 took the reasoning a step further and found
that racial discrimination by restaurants serving only local customers
but who bought some portion of their supplies in interstate commerce
impacted interstate commerce and was subject to federal control. One
can quickly see the logic of Heart of Atlanta Motel, that a black
businesswoman would have great difficulty traveling interstate in her
business dealings because of racial discrimination by hotels and
motels. It is harder to see the interstate impact of racial discrimination
against local black families by racist restaurants who did not serve
interstate travelers. This is not intended to deemphasize the odium of
such discrimination, but just to raise doubt about the impact on
interstate commerce.
Both Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung as companion cases,
involved the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
was a workaround to avoid the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, 226 which had
held that Congress did not have the power to remedy private violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 The Civil Rights Cases held

224
225
226
227

and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . when— (1) the
person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . .”). Id. at 176
– 77 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 284 (“The Senate Committee laid
emphasis on the Commerce Clause. The use of the Commerce Clause to
surmount what was thought to be the obstacle of the Civil Rights Cases is
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unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which criminalized
racial discrimination by private places of public accommodation and
other public uses. 228 The Court in the Civil Rights Cases gave a
limiting construction to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment says that “No State . . . shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws.”229 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.” 230 The Civil Rights Cases said that Section 5 meant that
Congress could pass legislation only as to “state action” in violation of
the substantive provisions, not as in the Civil Rights Act “private
acts.”231 Racial discrimination by the private Grand Opera House in
New York was certainly odious, but it did not come within federal
power under Section 5 because no state action was involved.232 Since

228

229
230
231

232

mentioned.” (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted)); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the right to pass “appropriate legislation” to enforce
“the provisions of this article.”).
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. The law applied to “the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement” and provided for civil damages of $500 per offense and criminal
penalties of a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment of “not less than 30 days
nor more than one year.” Id. at 20.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (“And so in the present case, until
some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or
agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into
activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts
done under State authority.”).
Id. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment.”); see also James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The
Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred Plus Year Old Error, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
451 (1998) (arguing that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided and
should be reversed).
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the Civil Rights Cases precluded the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
to bar private racial discrimination, Congress sought to justify the
reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include private racial
discrimination as based upon its commerce power.233
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred discrimination in places of
public accommodation “on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin.”234 Public accommodations included places of lodging,
restaurants, and cinemas,235 which affected interstate commerce. As to
lodgings, the Act declared that “any inn, hotel, motel, or other
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests” affected
commerce per se. 236 In other words, if the trial court found that a
covered hotel discriminated as to race against an interstate traveler, the
Act was violated. There was no requirement that the court find any
impact on interstate commerce. Congress had found that the impact on
commerce from such actions per se affected interstate commerce.
While many prior federal laws required the courts to find some effect
on interstate commerce, in some others, Congress had made a per se
finding. Heart of Atlanta Motel was the first to make this aspect of the
law a determinative feature.237

233

234
235

236

237

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was based on both commerce power and its power
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act applied “if [the covered business
establishments’] operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation
by it is supported by State action.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964). There was no allegation of state action as to the
privately owned Heart of Atlanta Motel except by Justice Douglas who in a
concurring opinion argued that there was sufficient state action to bring the law
within Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 282 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“That definition [of state action] is within our decision of Shelley
v. Kraemer for the ‘discrimination’ in the present cases is ‘enforced by officials
of the State,’ i.e., by the state judiciary under the trespass laws.”).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 247–48. In the Act, a cinema was charmingly called a “motion picture
house.” Id. at 247. The jurisdictional peg for motion picture houses was for the
films “which move in commerce.” Id. at 248.
Id. at 247. The Court does not use the term per se, but that it is clearly what it
has it mind; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23 (“It proceeds ex
directo to declare that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed
offenses, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of
the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional
wrong committed by the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon
any such wrong committed.”).
An early such law with a per se finding was the FLSA upheld in Darby.
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After an extended discussion of its commerce power cases, the
Court concluded, with echoes of the substantial effects test, “Thus the
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the
power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities
in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.”238 Applying the
substantial effects test, including the aggregate impact, there is little
doubt that racial discrimination against interstate travelers would have
a substantial and harmful impact on interstate commerce.239
But the Court did not leave it there. It added that the question was
“whether Congress had a rational basis”240 for its per se holding that
racial discrimination by hotels serving interstate travelers always
affected interstate commerce. The Court said that there was no need to
see any evidence of this as congressional hearings on the evils of racial
discrimination against interstate travelers had amply demonstrated that
there was such a rational basis.241 The Court offered no explanations or
238
239

240
241

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258.
Justice Black’s concurring opinion had a note of caution but ultimately yielded
to the class impact test, “I recognize too that some isolated and remote
lunchroom which sells only to local people and buys almost all its supplies in
the locality may possibly be beyond the reach of the power of Congress to
regulate commerce, just as such an establishment is not covered by the present
Act. But in deciding the constitutional power of Congress in cases like the two
before us we do not consider the effect on interstate commerce of only one
isolated, individual, local event, without regard to the fact that this single local
event when added to many others of a similar nature may impose a burden on
interstate commerce by reducing its volume or distorting its flow.” Id. at 275
(Black, J., concurring). For Justice Black, the Court finally went too far in
Daniel v. Paul, involving racial exclusion as to the Lake Nixon Club, a 232 acre
swimming and boating amusement area 12 miles west of Little Rock, Arkansas.
See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). He thought there was little chance that
interstate travelers would find their way there, “While it is the duty of courts to
enforce this important Act, we are not called on to hold nor should we hold
subject to that Act this country people’s recreation center, lying in what may be,
so far as we know, a little ‘sleepy hollow’ between Arkansas hills miles away
from any interstate highway. This would be stretching the Commerce Clause so
as to give the Federal Government complete control over every little remote
country place of recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and
county in every one of the 50 States. This goes too far for me.” Id. at 315
(Black, J., dissenting).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258.
Id. The Court referred to “evidence” in support of the harm to interstate
commerce, “One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed
above to see that Congress may—as it has—prohibit racial discrimination by
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precedents for the need to only find a rational basis. The Court brought
the rational basis test into the commerce power cases without preamble
or explanation. Since it is likely that it could easily be shown that such
racial discrimination against interstate travelers did substantially
impact interstate commerce, the rational basis test added little or
nothing to the holding in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Its companion case,
Katzenbach v. McClung is a different matter.
In McClung, the Court dealt with another provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, this time that portion of the Act that said
discrimination by restaurants that purchased a “substantial” 242 amount
of its supplies in interstate commerce had a per se impact on interstate
commerce. 243 In the case, Ollie’s Barbeque, a local Birmingham,
Alabama barbeque joint, was not alleged to have served any interstate
travelers; rather, it was alleged that it had purchased some 46%
($69,683) of its food from a local supplier who in turn procured it from
out of state.244 Ollie’s racism was open and notorious, serving only
whites in the interior portions of the restaurant but offering blacks
service in a backdoor takeout window. To the government’s argument
that the class or aggregate impact of racial discrimination by such
restaurants affected interstate commerce, Ollie’s argument was that it
was not part of such a class, that its overt racism led it to sell far more
barbeque than if it fully integrated its restaurant, a result that would

242

243

244

motels serving travelers, however ‘local’ their operations may appear.” Id. But
the Court’s reference to “evidence” was not to any congressional findings, of
which there were none, but to testimony of various parties to House and Senate
congressional committees. Id. at 252–53.
The government’s indictment was challenged because it used the word “some,”
“This use of the word ‘some’, say defendants, is insufficient because the act uses
the term ‘substantial’ . . . .” McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 818
(N.D. Ala.), rev’d 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The lower court found that a substantial
amount had moved in interstate commerce. But the lower court had found no
substantial effect on interstate commerce, “If Congress has the naked power to
do what it has attempted in title II of this act, there is no facet of human behavior
which it may not control by mere legislative ipse dixit that conduct ‘affect(s)
commerce’ when in fact it does not do so at all, and rights of the individual to
liberty and property are in dire peril.” Id. at 825.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964). The act stated that any
“restaurant . . . principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises” did per se affect commerce under the Act “if . . . it serves or offers to
serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . .
has moved in commerce.” Id.
Id. at 296.
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have led to a loss of white patrons.245 It is the simplicity of this evil
claim that made the rational basis test far more important in McClung
than in Heart of Atlanta Motel.
As in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the law did not require that the Court
find any substantial effect on interstate commerce. Rather, Congress
had specifically said that restaurants buying a substantial amount of
their supplies in interstate commerce did per se affect interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court conceded “The volume of food
purchased by Ollie’s Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state
was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs moving in
commerce.”246 Nonetheless, the Court relied on the aggregate impact
doctrine of Wickard, “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.”247 It said that racial discrimination was nationwide in scope
and that “Congress appropriately considered the importance of that
connection with the knowledge that the discrimination was but
‘representative of many others throughout the country, the total
incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in
its harm to commerce.’”248 The Court did not address Ollie’s claim
that he was not part of a class adversely impacting interstate commerce
since, if he did not engage in such racial discrimination, he would lose
his white customers.
The Court noted that it was not uncommon for Congress to declare
that certain activity per se impacted interstate commerce as it had done
in the Darby case.249 But the Court in McClung made a leap of logic
that the Darby case did not make. Darby had said, “In passing on the
validity of legislation of the class last mentioned [where Congress had
made a per se finding] the only function of courts is to determine
whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the
reach of the federal power.”250 But Darby did not say what test was to
245

246
247
248
249

250

Id. at 297 (“The court below concluded that if it were required to serve Negroes
it would lose a substantial amount of business.”).
Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).
Id. (quoting Polish Nat’l All. of U.S. v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944)).
Darby itself was not the first. Darby, in addition to “the present act,” mentioned
“the Safety Appliance Act . . . and the Railway Labor Act.” United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941).
Id. at 120–21.
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be used to determine if such a per se finding fell “within the reach of
the federal power.” There is no reason to believe that it would not have
been the substantial effects test that Darby was applying.251 McClung
said that the mere fact that Congress had made a per se finding of
effect on interstate commerce “does not preclude further examination
by this Court,”252 but essentially in applying the rational basis test it
did preclude just that. Following Heart of Atlanta Motel, the further
examination was only to see if Congress “in light of the facts and
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.” 253 No
formal findings were required to show this rational basis.254 Given the
results of congressional hearings, the Court concluded that Congress
“had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in
restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce.” 255 It concluded, “The absence of direct evidence
connecting discriminatory restaurant service with the flow of interstate
food, a factor on which the appellees place much reliance, is not, given
the evidence as to the effect of such practices on other aspects of
commerce, a crucial matter.” 256 Most of the congressional hearings
dealt with the impact of racial discrimination on interstate travelers.
The Court then claimed that its interpretation of the commerce power
251

252
253
254

255
256

In describing Congress’ commerce power, Darby does use language similar to
the rational basis test, “[Congress’ power] extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of
a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.” Id. at 118 (citing McCulloch’s use of “appropriate” as a
synonym for “necessary and proper” (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819)). Darby then states a paragraph later what the appropriate test was, “But
it does not follow that Congress may not by appropriate legislation regulate
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
Id. at 119.
McClung, 379 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 303–04.
Id. at 304. The Court cited to United States v. Carolene Products Company, the
quintessential rational basis due process case. United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Carolene had found that a ban on the sale of
skim milk to which coconut oil had been added rationally related to legitimate
governmental ends. Id. 151–52. Congressional hearings, the Court said, amply
supported the government’s health and fraud concerns. Id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 304–05.
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was consistent with history, “The power of Congress in this field is
broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no
express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court,
going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to
interfere.”257
The first Supreme Court case to apply the rational basis to a
Commerce Clause case after Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung was
Maryland v. Wirtz258 in 1976. The dearth of any attempt to find some
actual substantial impact on commerce in Wirtz indicates the impact of
the rational basis test on the commerce power and its impact on
fundamental concepts of federalism. Wirtz was of primary importance
because it upheld against a Tenth Amendment challenge to Congress’
right to impose the federal maximum hour and minimum wage of the
FLSA on state and local employees.259 In a 1961 amendment to the
FLSA, Congress had eliminated an exemption in the original act for
state and local government employees “of hospitals, institutions, and
schools.” 260 Essentially, Wirtz held that if Congress had commerce
power, it could impose the same laws it imposed on private entities on
states and political subdivisions of states. It was only limitations on the
enumerated power that protected concepts of federalism. The 1961
amendment had expanded the reach of Congress’ commerce power to
regulate not just employees connected to interstate commerce, but to
all employees of any “enterprise” engaged in interstate commerce.261

257
258

259

260

Id. at 305.
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 201. Justice Douglas’ dissent summarized this issue, “The Court’s opinion
skillfully brings employees of state-owned enterprises within the reach of the
Commerce Clause; and as an exercise in semantics it is unexceptionable if
congressional federalism is the standard. But what is done here is nonetheless
such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment
that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism.” Id.
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Wirtz was overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, on Tenth Amendment grounds, which in turn was overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia held, as Wirtz had, that if Congress had the
enumerated power, in both cases commerce power, the Tenth Amendment did
not preclude it from applying generally applicable laws not just to private
entities but also to state and local entities.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 187.
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The result was to include no additional companies, but some additional
employees.
In Wirtz, the Court described Darby both in terms of the substantial
effects test and the rational basis test. The first step in Darby, the Wirtz
court said, was its finding that Congress can “by appropriate
legislation regulate intrastate activities where they have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.”262 The second step was to determine if
there was such a substantial effect.263 Here, Congress had specifically
found a per se substantial effect.264 Third, since Congress had made
that specific finding, the Court had only a final task: “But where we
find that the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.”265 Wirtz then concluded summarily, “There
was obviously a ‘rational basis’ for the logical inference that the pay
and hours of production employees affect a company’s competitive
position.”266 As for the expansion of the FLSA to include employees
who did no work in interstate commerce but who worked for
enterprises that did, the Court said, “The class of employers subject to
the Act was not enlarged by the addition of the enterprise concept. The
definition of that class is as rational now as it was when Darby was
decided.”267 Other than the conclusion that there was a rational basis

261

262
263
264
265
266

267

Id. The Court said that the change from employees engaged in interstate
commerce to enterprises engaged in interstate commerce did not make a
constitutional difference, “Thus the effect of the 1961 change was to extend
protection to the fellow employees of any employee who would have been
protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of employers subject to
the Act.” Id. at 188. It said that the enterprise concept was “settled by the
reasoning of Darby itself and is independently established by principles stated in
other cases.” Id.
Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941)).
Id.
Id. at 190 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964))
Id. at 190 (quoting McClung, 379 U.S. at 303–04).
Id. at 190. The quotations around rational basis are in the original. Wirtz also
referenced that “other cases have found a ‘rational basis’ for statutes regulating
labor conditions in order to protect interstate commerce from labor strife.” Id. at
191. The only citation was to Jones & Laughlin Steel, which did not apply that
test.
Id. at 193.
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for the enterprise concept, there was no attempt to apply the rational
basis test.268
Wirtz does not expand the Darby substantial effects test or the
rational basis test, but it does reinforce the basic approach of the Court.
First, the general rule is that Congress has the commerce power to
regulate intrastate commerce or any other local activity if it
substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, if commerce power
is challenged, it is the trial court’s job to determine if the local activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. As has been seen in Jones &
Laughlin Steel, that is a practical factual evaluation. 269 Third, if
Congress makes a per se finding that certain local activity will always
substantially affect interstate commerce, then the trial courts job is
only to determine if those per se local activities occurred and then to
decide if Congress had a rational basis for believing that the local
activities did substantially impact interstate commerce. It is not the
trial court’s job to determine if there was in fact some substantial
impact, only to determine if Congress could rationally or conceivably
believe that there was. Finally, if Congress does not make a per se
finding, then only the practical factual evaluation of the substantial
effects test comes into play, not the rational basis test.
Hodel v. Indiana, 270 in 1981, applied the rational basis test in
commerce cases to a federal law requiring corrective measures to
restore surface land subject to strip mining and was alleged to be in
violation of the commerce power in addition to numerous other
constitutional provisions.271 As to the commerce claim, the Court said,
“It is established beyond peradverture [sic] that ‘legislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court
with a presumption of constitutionality . . . .’”272 For this proposition,
268

269

270
271

272

Id. at 195 (“It is therefore clear that a ‘rational basis’ exists for congressional
action prescribing minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals, as for
other importing enterprises.”).
See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (“We
have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is
equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a
judgment that does not ignore actual experience.”).
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
Id. at 320 (“The complaints alleged that the Act contravenes the Commerce
Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
Id. at 323.
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the Court cited Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company, 273 which
was strictly a statement about the rational basis Due Process Clause,
not commerce power. Bringing the presumption of the
constitutionality of economic legislation from due process cases to
commerce power cases was an important turn in commerce cases.
Citing McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Hodel said that a court
could “invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only
if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce.” 274 It then
misapplied the class or aggregate impact test, saying that the volume
of commerce actually affected was not a relevant inquiry, “The
pertinent inquiry therefore is not how much commerce is involved but
whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity
affects interstate commerce.” 275 The Court misused language
in N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt concerning the class impact test to support this
proposition, “The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.”276 Of
273

274

275

276

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Usery, coal mine
operators claimed that it violated their due process rights to impose liability for
miners who were disabled by black lung’s disease prior to the act being passed
and prior to the awareness of the cause of the disease. Id. at 1.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 323–24. For a similar conclusion as to the Congress’
commerce power, see the related case, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981), where it was found that,
“The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.” See also
Preseault v. I.C.C., where the Court found that a “tracks to trails” program
whereby unused railroad lines were converted to walking trails was within
federal commerce power without much support at all: “We evaluate this claim
under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce ‘if
there is any rational basis for such a finding,’ Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Assn., Inc., and we must ensure only that the means selected by
Congress are ‘reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.’”
Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)). Preseault, although it made no attempt to
truly address the commerce power issue, is worth noting since the federal law,
unlike Katzenbach and the other rational basis cases, made no findings that
certain local activities would per se affect interstate commerce.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 324. This holding misused language in N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt
concerning the class impact test to support this proposition. Of course, the
volume of commerce is important, but not just the volume of one person, the
volume of the class impact.
N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).
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course the volume of commerce is important, but not just the volume
of one person, the volume of the class impact. Going further, the Court
said that it was not necessary that each provision in an act had an
impact on interstate commerce, but that in a “complex regulatory
program” it was “enough that the challenged provisions are an integral
part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when
considered as a whole satisfies this test.”277 While there is a certain
logic to the Court’s point about complex regulatory businesses—it
would make no sense to require that each part of a complex law impact
interstate commerce—there was virtually no precedent for the point.278
VIII. A RETURN TO THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST
Two of the most famous recent commerce power cases are United
States v. Lopez279 and United States v. Morrison.280 Both were the first
cases by the Supreme Court since Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided
in 1937 finding that federal laws were outside the scope of Congress’
commerce power. Lopez found that Congress did not have the
commerce power to criminalize the possession of a gun on or near a
public or private school. Morrison held that Congress did not have the
commerce power to provide a civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence. In neither case did Congress require some jurisdictional tag
connecting the acts to interstate commerce, and in both the Supreme
Court applied the substantial effects test, 281 not the rational basis
test. 282 On a more practical note, both cases involved unnecessary
277
278

279
280
281

282

Hodel, 425 U.S. at 329 n.17.
Id. The Court cited to many of the key commerce cases as support for this
proposition—Heart of Atlanta Motel, McClung, Perez, Wickard, and Darby—
but none of the language cited to actually supports the proposition. Most relate
at most to the class or aggregate impact doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See Lopez, (“We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that
the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at
610 (“Reviewing our case law, we noted that ‘we have upheld a wide variety of
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have
concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.’”).
Lopez acknowledged the rational basis test, but did not apply it. Lopez quoting
Jones & Laughlin Steel warned that commerce power should not be so extended
as to “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
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federal laws, which paralleled state laws. Whether constitutional or
not, there was no need whatsoever to make a federal crime out of what
were already state crimes.
The Court in Lopez identified the three categories of federal
commerce power first used by the Court in Perez:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce.
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities
that
substantially
affect
interstate
283
commerce.
Because this language is so widely quoted or paraphrased by the
courts, including the Raich case, 284 it is important to distinguish it

283

284

create a completely centralized government.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). After
summarizing Darby and Wickard, Lopez then inserted the rational basis test,
“Since that time, the Court has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide
whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.” Id. The Court also referred to the
rational basis test in responding to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, “Justice
Breyer rejects our reading of precedent and argues that ‘Congress . . . could
rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line.’” Id. at
565. The only other mention of the rational basis test in the case is in Justice
Souter’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). The first mention
of the rational basis test in Morrison was in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion
in that case, “But the sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide
a rational basis for the finding cannot seriously be questioned.” Morrison, 529
U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (citations omitted). It is easy to agree with what
seems to be Justice Scalia’s claim that the reference to these three categories
seems more rote than instructive, “[O]ur cases have mechanically recited that
the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories.”
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Given that Raich did not remotely involve items crossing state lines, it is
understandable that Raich has the most barebones statement of these categories,
“First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
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from the substantial effects test. In both of the first two categories, the
Court is referring to Congress’ power to regulate commerce between
two states, not local activities affecting interstate commerce. The
regulation of commerce between two states is the clearest instantiation
of the federal power.285 Unfortunately, there is no obvious distinction
between the channels category and the instrumentality category.
Further, the Court illustrates the instrumentalities categories using
cases involving the effect on interstate commerce, further confusing
the distinctions.
As to the channels of interstate commerce, Lopez used Darby,286
the transportation of goods made by a person paid less than required
by the FLSA, and Heart of Atlanta Motel,287 the movement of persons

285

286

287

commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has
the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id.
at 16–17 (citations omitted). Supporting Justice Scalia’s point about mechanical
references, the Raich case indicates what often happens to Supreme Court
precedents. Perez and Lopez cited historical examples that supported the
categories, while Raich just cited the categories without any historical context.
The problem is that the first two categories make little enough sense even with
the historical references, and make virtually none without them. But since the
reversal of Hammer, few have questioned federal power to regulate anything
crossing state lines. But see Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 258–59
(“This article calls for a reexamination of the long-standing, yet inadequately
examined, assumption that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce
necessarily includes the power not only to (as the Raich Court put it) ‘protect’
interstate markets but also to ‘eradicate’ them.”).
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The first two categories are
self-evident, since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself. . . .
[U]nlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce,
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of
interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the
Commerce Clause alone.”).
Lopez appears to cite to the following language in Darby, “Congress, following
its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the
commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the
state has not sought to regulate their use.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
114 (1941) (citations omitted). Among other cases, Darby cited The Lottery
Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets crossing state
lines), Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (adulterated foods
crossing state lines) and Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (women
transported across interstate lines for immoral purposes).
The reference seems to be to this language, “‘Commerce among the states, we
have said, consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes
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across state lines, as examples. Perez had been a bit more detailed and
framed the issue in terms of the misuse of interstate commerce, which
seems a bit more helpful: “First, the use of channels of interstate or
foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for
example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been
kidnaped.”288 Perez used as an example of protecting the channels of
interstate commerce, the Lindbergh Act, which made it a crime for
either the victim to be transported or the kidnapper to travel across
state lines.289
As for the second category, the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, Lopez gave as examples The Shreveport Rate Cases and
Southern Railway, both problematic examples of power over
instrumentalities in interstate commerce since both involved the
regulation of local activities affecting interstate commerce, not the
regulation of things crossing state lines. The Shreveport Rate Cases
had held that the ICC could consider intrastate rates in Texas because
of their impact on interstate commerce from Louisiana into Texas.290
Southern Railway had held that Congress could, under the federal
Railway Safety Act, regulate safety on intrastate railroad cars because
the railroad company had so intermingled its intrastate and interstate
business that it was impossible to tell them apart.291 Nonetheless, the
Court’s point seems to be that Congress has great power in protecting
instrumentalities crossing state lines. The Court makes this clear with

288
289
290

291

the transportation of persons and porperty [sic].’ . . . Nor does it make any
difference whether the transportation is commercial in character.” Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citations
omitted).
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citations omitted).
Id.
See The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 358–59 (1914) (“This is plainly
the case when the Commission finds that unjust discrimination against interstate
trade arises from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as maintained by a
carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one with which Congress alone is
competent to deal . . . .”).
See S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911), in which the Court
asked, “Or, stating it in another way, Is there such a close or direct relation or
connection between the two classes of traffic, when moving over the same
railroad, as to make it certain that the safety of the interstate traffic and of those
who are employed in its movement will be promoted in a real or substantial
sense by applying the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the
traffic which is intrastate as well as to those used in moving that which is
interstate?” The Court gave an affirmative answer. Id.
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two examples mentioned in Perez, the destruction of an aircraft “used,
operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce,” and theft from interstate shipments “in interstate or
foreign commerce.”292
The Court’s distinction between channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce seems unhelpful to a strong degree, but luckily it
is of no great importance to distinguish between the two, since both
fall within federal power. What is important is that they are both
examples of Congress protecting the actual crossing of state lines and
not local activities affecting interstate commerce.
Lopez then turned to the issue at hand, “activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.” The majority opinion although
referencing both McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel emphasized the
substantial effects test:293
First, we have upheld a wide variety of congressional
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we
have concluded that the activity substantially affected
interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation
of intrastate coal mining; intrastate extortionate credit
transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate
supplies, inns and hotels catering to interstate
guests, and production and consumption of homegrown
wheat. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but
the pattern is clear. Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.294
The law in Lopez, banning the possession of a gun on or near schools,
made no attempt to tie the crime to any aspect of interstate commerce;
292
293

294

Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 659).
After discussing Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard, the Court briefly
mentioned the rational basis line of cases. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 (1995). But there was no attempt to apply or distinguish the rational basis
test.
Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy called Perez, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, and McClung “[l]ater examples of the exercise of federal power where
commercial transactions were the subject of regulation . . .” Id. at 573. He
seemed to dismiss them as being significant advancements, “These and like
authorities are within the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception of
commercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision today.” Id.
at 573–74. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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failing to make use of what are commonly called jurisdictional pegs.295
It was also totally devoid of any connection to “any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,” what the
Court called “commerce.” 296 Since no economic enterprise or
commerce was involved, the Court said that the class or aggregate
impact doctrine did not apply: “It cannot, therefore, be sustained under
our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”297 This emphasis
on commercial activity as opposed to other activity may be defensible,
but it is not necessarily supported by precedent. 298 Certainly, in the
pure commerce cases involving the crossing of state lines, the
commerce power was not limited to economic activity. But even in the
295

296
297
298

The federal crime, the Court said, “contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 561. Nor did the facts raise any
issues as to interstate commerce: “Respondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce,
and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete
tie to interstate commerce.” Id. at 567.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Justice Souter in dissent did not think the distinction workable. Id. at 608
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between what is patently commercial
and what is not looks much like the old distinction between what directly affects
commerce and what touches it only indirectly.”); see Friedman & Lakier, supra
note 169, at 256 (“Commencing with United States v Lopez, the Supreme Court
drew a line resting on the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’
activity. That line quickly withered.”). The difficulty in applying the distinction
between economic or commercial and the opposite is suggested by Melissa Irr in
her instructive article on the role of congressional findings. See Melissa
Irr, United States v. Morrison; An Analysis of the Diminished Effect of
Congressional Findings in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and a Criticism of
the Abandonment of the Rational Basis Test, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 815, 834
(2001) (“If a statute similar to the one in Wickard were before the current Court,
it would likely find the statute unconstitutional under the
current CommerceClause [sic] framework. The production of wheat is not an
inherently economic activity.”). Irr may or may not be correct as to the
Morrison’s court view of Wickard, but surely she is incorrect as to Wickard
being “not an inherently economic activity.” Id. at 834. Home grown and
consumed wheat was 20% of a multibillion dollar business in the United States.
But Irr may be correct on the bigger issue. Id. (“The Court’s focus on the
economic or noneconomic nature of the regulation is unworkable in
the Commerce Clause context and may result in the striking down of statutes
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”).
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Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung’s rational basis cases involving
racial discrimination, the emphasis was on the economic harm299 of
racial discrimination on interstate travelers and on goods purchased in
interstate commerce.300 In his dissent to Lopez, Justice Breyer makes a
strong argument against the commercial and noncommercial
distinctions, equating them to E.C. Knight’s comparison of
manufacturing versus commerce, or the direct/indirect test. The issue
was not nomenclature, he said, but the actual practical effect on
interstate commerce. 301 He also argued that given the real impact
education has on the economy, Lopez was the wrong case to make that
distinction. Nonetheless, one can accept the Court’s conclusion in
Lopez without accepting its commercial and noncommercial
distinctions.
The government’s assertion that guns on school grounds did
impact interstate commerce was met with something close to derision.
The government argued that guns on or near schools might result in
violent crime and that violent crime impacts interstate commerce; first,
in that its costs are substantial; second, that violent crime might make
persons unwilling to travel to parts of the country that might be
perceived as unsafe; and third, that guns in schools are a substantial
299

300

301

But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority clearly
cannot intend such a distinction to focus narrowly on an act of gun possession
standing by itself, for such a reading could not be reconciled with either the civil
rights cases (McClung and Daniel) or Perez—in each of those cases the specific
transaction (the race-based exclusion, the use of force) was not itself
‘commercial.’”).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing against a commerce power approach and
stating that his “reluctance is not due to any conviction that Congress lacks
power to regulate commerce in the interests of human rights. It is rather my
belief that the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against
them because of race, like the ‘right of persons to move freely from State to
State’ ‘occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does
the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.’” (citations
omitted)). Justice Douglas favored federal power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, “A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment
would have a more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a
particular restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of the Act or
whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler. Under my construction,
the Act would apply to all customers in all the enumerated places of public
accommodation. And that construction would put an end to all obstructionist
strategies and finally close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.” Id.
at 280.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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threat to the learning environment which results in less productive
citizens. The Court said that under the government’s “costs of crime”
logic, “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously
they relate to interstate commerce.” 302 And under its “national
productivity” logic, “Congress could regulate any activity that it found
was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family
law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.”303
Finally, with the Court’s slippery slope concerns running rampant, it
said that it would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to
accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.”304
The majority’s concluding paragraph is an anthem to fading
principles of federalism and is worth quoting in full:
To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long
steps down that road, giving great deference to
congressional action. See [Hodel, Perez, McClung,
Heart of Atlanta Motel]. The broad language in these
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further.
To do so would require us to conclude that the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v.
Ogden, and that there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local,
cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel. This we are unwilling to
do.305
302
303
304
305

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted).
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Many of the historic issues related to federal power are here, the
House that Jack built concerns of President Jefferson, the intrusion on
state powers of the E.C. Knight and Hammer era, the recognition of
the overreaching scope of the rational basis cases, and the respect for
the foundational cases of Gibbons and Jones & Laughlin Steel.306
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Stevens, and
Ginsburg joined, relied on the rational basis test. He described nicely
how the rational basis test changed the role of the courts in commerce
power cases:
[T]he Constitution requires us to judge the connection
between a regulated activity and interstate commerce,
not directly, but at one remove. Courts must give
Congress a degree of leeway in determining the
existence of a significant factual connection between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce—both
because the Constitution delegates the commerce power
directly to Congress and because the determination
requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a
legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy. The traditional words “rational basis”
capture this leeway. Thus, the specific question before
us, as the Court recognizes, is not whether the
“regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce,” but, rather, whether Congress could have
had “a rational basis” for so concluding.307

306

307

Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (putting the issue in grander terms of the
importance of federalism, “Although it is the obligation of all officers of the
Government to respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too
essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in
securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In order to reconcile the
rational basis Commerce Clause cases to history, Justice Breyer undertakes a
somewhat quixotic attempt to change the vocabulary: “[T]he power to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States, encompasses the power to regulate
local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce. . . . I use
the word significant because the word substantial implies a somewhat narrower
power than recent precedent suggests. But to speak of substantial effect rather
than significant effect would make no difference in this case.” Id. at 615–16
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Breyer made clear the difference between the substantial effects test of
Jones & Laughlin Steel and how it is applied in the rational basis line
of cases. In the former, the Court made the practical factual
determination that commerce had been substantially impacted. In the
latter, the question was only whether Congress might rationally have
found such a substantial impact, not whether there was in fact one, or
indeed even if Congress itself had found one.308 And given the ease of
passing the rational basis test, the conclusion for the dissent was
forgone, “Upholding this legislation would do no more than simply
recognize that Congress had a ‘rational basis’ for finding a significant
connection between guns in or near schools and (through their effect
on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threaten.”309
Perhaps no case better illustrates the human dimensions of the
limits on commerce power than United States v. Morrison. In the case,
the victim said that she had been raped by two football players at
Virginia Tech. In response to the school’s failure to punish her
attackers and to protect her, she filed a civil action in federal court
alleging damages under the federal Violence Against Women’s Act of
1994 (“VAWA”), which provided for compensatory and punitive
damages for violence motivated by gender bias.310 The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of her action as being beyond the
scope of Congress’ power, either under the Commerce Clause or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress’ power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against equal
protection violations was limited to state actions, not to the private
actions in the case, however horrific.311 The Court could find no state
action in the case. That holding is beyond the scope of this Article.
308

309
310

311

Id. at 618 (explaining that “[T]here is no special need here for a clear indication
of Congress’ rationale.”). The Court’s job, Breyer said, was only to ask
“whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate
commerce.” Id.
Id. at 631.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605–06 (2000). The Act stated that
“All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes
of violence motivated by gender” and declared that any person who committed
such a crime was “liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.” Id. at 605.
Id. at 621 (summarizing the precedents, “Shortly after the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment’s
provisions, United States v. Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases. In Harris, the
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As to the commerce power, the law itself had no jurisdictional
pegs 312 but did include “gender motivated violence . . . affecting
interstate commerce”313 The Court cited Lopez for the applicable law,
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”314 Following the
logic of its Lopez case, the Court doubled down on the importance of
commercial versus noncommercial activity:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity. While we need
not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide
these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in
nature.315

312

313
314
315

Court considered a challenge to § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section
sought to punish ‘private persons’ for ‘conspiring to deprive any one of the
equal protection of the laws enacted by the State.’ We concluded that this law
exceeded Congress’ § 5 power because the law was ‘directed exclusively against
the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their
administration by her officers.’ . . . We reached a similar conclusion in the Civil
Rights Cases. In those consolidated cases, we held that the public
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to
purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power.”
(citations omitted)).
Id. at 612. The Court said, just as it did in the School Gun Act in Lopez, that the
VAWA contained no jurisdictional element that might indicate some connection
to commerce. “Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is
in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. The Court
compared the civil remedy in VAWA with the criminal provision of the VAWA,
which states: “A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian
country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person’s spouse or
intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to
such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b).” 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994) (amended 2013). The criminal provision is
cited by Morrison apparently to contrast its use of the crossing state lines
jurisdictional peg as compared with no jurisdictional peg in the civil provision.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5.
34 U.S.C. § 12361 (1994).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
Id. at 613.
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The presence of substantial congressional findings of impact on
interstate commerce, unlike the Lopez case that had none, did not sway
the Court: “But the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation. As we stated in Lopez, ‘[S]imply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” 316 Rather, the Court
continued, “Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question,
and can be settled finally only by this Court.”317
In terms of the impact on interstate commerce, the Court was not
impressed with the congressional findings:
The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow
the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of
violent crime (the suppression of which has always
been the prime object of the States’ police power) to
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If
accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress
to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects
on employment, production, transit, or consumption.
Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any
other type of violence since gender-motivated violence,
as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser
economic impacts than the larger class of which it is a
part.318
The Court said more broadly that Congress could not “regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 319 The Constitution
required, it said, “a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.” 320 The Court concluded, “The regulation and
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
316
317
318
319
320

Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 617–18.
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instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce
has always been the province of the States.”321 Unlike Lopez, where
the majority at least mentioned the rational basis approach, Morrison
left it to the dissent to raise the issue.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Souter, in which Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, framed the role of the courts versus
Congress in its most complete form:
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to
activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. The fact of such a substantial
effect is not an issue for the courts in the first
instance, but for the Congress, whose institutional
capacity for gathering evidence and taking
testimony far exceeds ours. By passing legislation,
Congress indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or
not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce
power. The business of the courts is to review the
congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply
for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional
basis exists in fact.322
Souter’s dissent extensively reviewed Congress’ finding of the
economic consequence of gender based violence concluding, “[T]he
sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide a rational basis
for the finding cannot seriously be questioned.”323 The dissent’s main
complaint was not that the Court had found no substantial effect on
interstate commerce, but that the Court was replacing the rational basis
test with categorical preferences for economic effects on interstate
commerce over noneconomic effects. Souter also objected to the
Court’s concern for the fact that the VAWA “addresses conduct
traditionally subject to state prohibition under domestic criminal law, a
fact said to have some heightened significance when the violent
conduct in question is not itself aimed directly at interstate commerce
or its instrumentalities.”324 As the dissent pointed out, the Court had
long since rejected the dual federalism notion that somehow areas
321

322
323
324

Id. at 618. The Court conveniently overlooked Perez in its summary of crimes
affecting interstate commerce.
Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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traditionally within state power limited congressional commerce
power: “Again, history seems to be recycling, for the theory of
traditional state concern as grounding a limiting principle has been
rejected previously, and more than once.”325
Although many themes run throughout Lopez and Morrison, at the
most simple level, the majority found that neither law involved local
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Meanwhile,
the dissent found that Congress could have rationally believed that
there was a substantial effect.326
IX. RAICH AND THE ASCENDENCY OF THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court held that the federal government
had the commerce power to regulate in-state grown marijuana for instate medicinal use, and that Congress could rationally believe that
even such local activity might substantially affect interstate
commerce. 327 California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, allowed
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. The federal Controlled
Substance Act (“CSA”) passed in 1970 treated marijuana as a
Schedule 1 drug, the most dangerous category, disallowing its use for
any purpose. Whatever the wisdom of the CSA, if the CSA was within
federal commerce power, it preempted the inconsistent state law.328
325
326

327
328

Id.
Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (taking a very holistic approach to reaching
this conclusion, Breyer stated, “We live in a Nation knit together by two
centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change.
Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no
matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the
State—at least when considered in the aggregate. And that fact makes it close to
impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter categories that
would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary Commerce Clause
‘aggregation’ rules without, at the same time, depriving Congress of the power
to regulate activities that have a genuine and important effect upon interstate
commerce. Since judges cannot change the world, the ‘defect’ means that,
within the bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance.”
(citations omitted).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
Id. at 29. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled
Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 15 (2013) (“In sum, courts
have applied a broad conflict preemption rule under the CSA. This rule finds
state law preempted if it requires violation of federal law or otherwise
undermines Congress’s objective of curbing marijuana consumption.”).
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Federal agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) came to the home of one marijuana user and destroyed all six
of her cannabis plants.329 Ms. Raich used marijuana for cancer pain
provided to her free by two caregivers.330 Ms. Raich and others filed a
preliminary injunction to prevent the United States Attorney
General331 from enforcing the CSA as to marijuana that is “cultivated
using only water and nutrients originating from within California, and
that it is grown exclusively with equipment, supplies, and materials
manufactured within the borders of the state.” 332 Despite the local
nature of the marijuana use, the federal government argued that “(1)
controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot
be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate; and (2) federal control of the intrastate incidents
of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective
control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.”333 The district court
found the CSA as applied was within Congress’ commerce power. The
Ninth Circuit reversed.334

329

330

331

332

333
334

Professor Mikos argues for a more limited view of preemption in CSA cases,
requiring a direct conflict. Id.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. Both county and federal agents raided one Ms. Monson’s
home. Id. The county agents concluded that her use marijuana was entirely
legal, but after a three-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and destroyed all
six of her plants. Id.
Id. Raich had to rely on two caregivers, listed as “John Does” in the case, who
provided her marijuana free of charge. Id.
Id. The United States Attorney General at the time the case was filed was John
Ashcroft, later superseded by Alberto Gonzales.
Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal.), rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222
(9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005). This was the claim of Ms. Raich. Id. The petitioner whose plants were
seized was even more local, coming from plants in her own backyard. Id.
Id. at 926.
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
its own precedent. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (9th Cir.
2003) (In McCoy, while painting Easter eggs and consuming large quantities of
alcohol, a sexually explicit picture of Mrs. McCoy and her ten-year-old daughter
was taken. Turned in for processing at the U.S. Navy Exchange in San Diego,
the McCoys were investigated by the NCIS, the FBI, and the San Diego police
and eventually charged with violating federal law making it a crime to possess
child pornography made with products from out of the state, in the case a Canon
Sureshot 60 camera and Kodac film. A jury acquitted Mr. McCoy. Mrs. McCoy
pleaded guilty subject to her appeal of the constitutional issues.). The Ninth
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Emphasizing the economic versus noneconomic logic of the Lopez
case, the Ninth Circuit said, “The cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes and not for exchange or distribution
is not properly characterized as commercial or economic activity.
Lacking sale, exchange or distribution, the activity does not possess
the essential elements of commerce.” 335 The Ninth Circuit made no
effort to determine if there was any substantial effect on commerce,
instead relying on a finding in another Ninth Circuit case, “Medical
marijuana, when grown locally for personal consumption, does not
have any direct or obvious effect on interstate commerce. Federal
efforts to regulate it considerably blur the distinction between what is
national and what is local.”336
In Raich, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the law begins with a
concise statement of the substantial effects test, “Our case law firmly
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.” 337 Wickard, the Court noted, had a
“striking”338 similarity to Raich. Both involved “a fungible commodity
for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market”339
and “the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will
draw such marijuana into that market.” 340 The Court may have
overstated this claim of a striking similarity since any similarity seems
more forced than real. Based upon the agreed findings of the parties in

335
336

337
338
339
340

Circuit found that the “possession of home-grown child pornography not
intended for distribution or exchange” was “not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity” and that there was no “relationship, attenuated or otherwise,
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce—and certainly not the
type of direct or substantial relationship necessary to justify the invocation by
Congress of its Commerce power . . . .” Id. at 1123–24. Making the connection
to the marijuana in Raich, the Ninth Circuit said, “As the photograph
in McCoy stood in contrast to the commercial nature of the larger child
pornography industry, so does the medicinal marijuana use at issue in this case
stand in contrast to the larger illicit drug trafficking industry.” Raich, 352 F.3d at
1230.
See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235.
Id. at 1233 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Kozinski, J., concurring)).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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Wickard,341 it involved a variability factor of 20% in a highly volatile
market. 342 Raich involved only congressional findings and the
common sense 343 likelihood that some homegrown marijuana for
homegrown use would find its way interstate. 344 Perez is the better
comparison. 345 For purposes of enforcement, distinguishing between
marijuana grown in California for use in California from marijuana
shipped in interstate commerce would be at least as difficult as
distinguishing loan sharking unaffiliated with organized crime from
that going into the pockets of organized crime.
More unforgivable is the Court’s misstatement of the rule of law
used in Wickard, the case that fairly or unfairly stands for an extreme
application of the substantial effects test, especially as to the class
impact. 346 Instead, in the Court’s framing, “In Wickard, we had no
341

342

343

344

345

346

Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing this difference with Wickard,
“Critically, the Court was able to consider ‘actual effects’ because the parties
had ‘stipulated a summary of the economics of the wheat industry.’ . . . With
real numbers at hand, the Wickard Court could easily conclude that ‘a factor of
such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial
influence on price and market conditions’ nationwide.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 20. Responding to Raich’s arguments, the Court seemed to concede that
the differences with Wickard, though not controlling, were substantial if not
striking. In Wickard (1) small farmers by law were excluded; (2) Wickard
involved commercial activity to the highest degree; and (3) the class impact on
the interstate and international price of wheat was significant. Id.
Id. at 28–29 (“The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a
significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption
of validity. Indeed, that judgment is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked
eye,’ under any commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an
open-ended exemption.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 20. The Court seemed to acknowledge the disconnect, “And while it is true
that the record in the Wickard case itself established the causal connection
between the production for local use and the national market, we have before us
findings by Congress to the same effect.” Id.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The federal law criminalized all
loansharking without requiring any interstate Commerce Clause connection. Id.
at 146–47. Though the Court in Perez does not mention it, a possible rational
would be that to require an interstate connection to organized crime would make
it impossible to prosecute much loan sharking, since any connection would be
vague and spidery at best.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). The class impact in Wickard was
far from some conceivable fact. The parties had stipulated that it varied by “an
amount greater than 20 per cent of average production,” the single biggest
variance by far. Id.
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difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing
that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat
outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on
price and market conditions.” 347 This then leads to its final
comparison, “Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would
similarly affect price and market conditions.”348 Wickard, of course,
was decided in 1942, some twenty-two years before the rational basis
test became part of the Court’s approach to Congress’ commerce
power.349
Then, as this Article begins, Raich wraps it up: (1) the Court’s role
in determining the scope of Congress’ commerce power was “a modest
one,” (2) the test was not whether Ms. Raich’s and the use by others of
homegrown, home-consumed marijuana “taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,” but (3) “only whether
a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.”350 And from there it was a
short journey to find that Congress might rationally have believed that
there were “enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between
marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere”351 and
that there were “concerns about diversion into illicit channels,”352 that
the law “ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.”353
And unlike Lopez and Morrison, which involved noneconomic
criminal matters, the Court said, Raich involved “quintessentially
347
348
349

350
351

352
353

Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
Id.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S 100 (1941) (the rational basis test is sometimes
dated to this case). Darby was one of the early cases where Congress made a per
se finding that certain things would affect interstate commerce. Darby said only
that such a per se finding would have to fall within federal power, not that the
test was the rational basis test: “In passing on the validity of legislation of the
class last mentioned [where Congress makes a per se finding] the only function
of courts is to determine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is
within the reach of the federal power.” Id. at 120–21.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (summarizing the majority’s point well,
“[M]arijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more
than an instant from the interstate market-and this is so whether or not the
possession is for medicinal use or lawful use under the laws of a particular
State.”).
Id. at 22.
Id.
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economic” 354 regulations of “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market.” 355 The Court’s penultimate sentence
before remanding the case is almost plaintive in its acknowledgment of
the weaknesses of the rational basis approach, “But perhaps even more
important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in which
the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be
heard in the halls of Congress.”356 It is no great insight to say that to
hope that Congress might, in this polarized age, do any such thing is
akin to hoping that global warming will reverse itself and year-long
wildfires in the west and tornadoes in the east will become a distant
memory.
The dissent of Justice O’Connor, in which Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas joined, applied a four-factor test from Lopez and
Morrison.357 First, economic activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce fell within federal power. A criminal statute “having
nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise”358
and was “not an essential part” of a larger regulatory scheme did
not.”359 Second, the law contained no jurisdictional peg, which might
establish some connection to interstate commerce.360 Third, although
legislative findings are not required for purposes of the commerce
power, their absence is “telling” especially when any impact on
interstate commerce is not “visible to the naked eye.”361 And fourth,
any claim of impact on interstate commerce was too attenuated, which
354
355
356
357

358

359
360
361

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 44–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the four factors: “First, we
observed that our ‘substantial effects’ cases generally have upheld federal
regulation of economic activity that affected interstate commerce . . . . Second,
we noted that the statute contained no express jurisdictional requirement
establishing its connection to interstate commerce. . . . Third, we found telling
the absence of legislative findings about the regulated conduct’s impact on
interstate commerce. . . . [Fourth], we rejected as too attenuated the
Government’s argument that firearm possession in school zones could result in
violent crime which in turn could adversely affect the national economy.”).
Id. at 44 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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if accepted would convert the commerce power into a general police
power.362 Justice O’Connor concluded, “In my view, the case before
us is materially indistinguishable from Lopez and Morrison when the
same considerations are taken into account.” 363 Justice O’Connor
barely acknowledged the Court’s use of the rational basis test, saying
almost in passing that if it was enough that regulating medical
marijuana was “a rational part of regulating” the relevant market that
“the Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human
activity into federal regulatory reach.”364 Perhaps an indication of how
entrenched the rational basis test was in the commerce cases, she did
not specifically reject it as the correct test.365
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was the sixth vote in favor of
the federal law, and it is hard to decide whether his separate approach
was puzzling or brilliant.366 He said that the substantial effects test was
not actually part of the Commerce Clause but derived from the
362
363

364
365

366

Id. at 44–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor validly points out that the
CSA could easily have excluded marijuana for medical or even recreational use,
but it is hard to see how that point has anything to do with commerce power.
She also claimed that “dual sovereignty animate[s] our Commerce Clause
cases,” especially “in areas of criminal law and social policy” where States had
long had power. Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Dual Sovereignty has been
a long rejected view of federal power and it is even harder to accept her
assertion that “state autonomy” was a relevant factor. Id.
Id. at 49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion did not mention the rational basis test at
all. Justice Thomas in his separate and somewhat strident dissent mentions one
case in which the Court applied the rational basis test but does not specifically
object to its use. He does object to the manipulation of the substantial effects test
to include noneconomic factors, “If the majority is to be taken seriously, the
Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck
suppers throughout the 50 States.” Id. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas is exaggerating, but given his visceral disagreement with the substantial
effects test, it would seem that he might have objected to the rational basis
expansion of that test.
See Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act
Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 379
(2007). Professor Mank seemed to have the same ambivalence, “Not joining the
majority opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia wrote an interesting and potentially
influential concurring opinion that relied on the Constitution’s Necessary and
Proper Clause to justify regulation of medical marijuana under
the Commerce Clause.” Id. Interesting seems exactly the opposite of influential.
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Necessary and Proper Clause. 367 And he thought that his insight
expanded commerce power:
And the category of “activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce,” is incomplete because the
authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the
regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to
laws governing intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a
regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.368
It is hard to see how viewing the necessary and proper as a separate
test would expand Congress’ commerce power beyond the substantial
effects test. The substantial effects test is the necessary and proper test
in the context of the commerce power. The substantial effects test in
Jones & Laughlin Steel was that Court’s test for local activities
affecting interstate commerce. It was that Court’s finding that a refusal
to engage in collective bargaining, a local activity, would have a
necessary and proper or appropriate relationship to interstate
commerce.369
367

368
369

Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia went back to United
States v. Coombs for support for this, “Any offence which thus interferes with,
obstructs, or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may
be punished by congress, under its general authority, to make all laws necessary
and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers.” United States v.
Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 74 (1838). In Coombs, the issue was whether Congress
could make theft from a beach-stranded vessel not in navigable waters a crime
under the Commerce Clause. It could. Id. at 78–79.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937). In the
sentences just before stating its “close and substantial” test, the Court in Jones &
Laughlin Steel did not directly cite but it did use terms from Chief Justice
Marshall opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden in
describing federal enumerated power and the Necessary and Proper Clause:
“The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power
to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection or advancement’ . . . That
power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no matter
what the source of the dangers which threaten it.’” Id. (emphasis added).
Compare with Marshall in McCulloch rejecting a narrow view of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, “This could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to
such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which
might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis added). And his definition of
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But then Justice Scalia may have been just typically brilliant. It
may be that Justice Scalia’s point is that the Necessary and Proper
Clause in addition to expanding Congress’ power to regulate local
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce also increases the
ability of Congress to expand its power to regulate its power over
things moving in interstate commerce. The majority opinion in United
States v. Comstock 370 seemed to support that view. 371 The Court in
Comstock emphasized that Congress had the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to incarcerate civilly “a mentally ill,
sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner
would otherwise be released.”372 In Comstock, the named plaintiff373
had been convicted of receipt of child pornography in interstate
commerce. The majority ultimately held that the civil extension of
Comstock’s sentence was necessary and proper to whatever federal
power—as to Comstock himself, Congress’ power to protect the
misuse of the channels of interstate commerce—supported the initial
criminal conviction. In sum, the Necessary and Proper Clause expands
Congress’ power to regulate things actually in interstate commerce.

370
371

372
373

commerce power in Gibbons could not be more sweeping, “If, as has always
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it
would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions
on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (emphasis added).
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
Id. at 129. The government in its brief said that the government did not rely on
the Commerce Clause, but contended that “[T]he court need not reach the
Commerce Clause issue to decide the case, arguing that Congress had the
authority to enact [the commitment law] pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause,” that the civil commitment power “flow[ed] from Congress’s power to
criminalize that conduct in the first place.” United States v. Comstock, 507 F.
Supp. 2d 522, 530 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.
2009), rev’d, 560 U.S. 126, rev’d, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 129.
Id. at 131–32. The Comstock case was a consolidation for five different persons
convicted of federal crimes contesting additional civil commitment beyond their
criminal sentence. Comstock’s conviction was for receipt of child pornography
via a computer, that is using “any visual depiction using any means or facility of
interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed,” a very typical federal
jurisdictional peg based upon the power to regulate things actually in interstate
commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008).
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After discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause, the ultimate
holding by the Court in Comstock was that whatever federal power
supported Comstock’s initial conviction would also support his civil
commitment. The federal power was the purest form of the commerce
power, involving the transportation across interstate lines of child
pornography. Justice Scalia’s and the Comstock court’s fascination
with the Necessary and Proper Clause in a Commerce Clause case is
misplaced in cases involving the effect of local activity on interstate
commerce. The substantial effects test is the specific necessary and
proper test in a commerce power case negating the need to apply a test
as vague and uncertain as the Necessary and Proper Clause.
X. SEBELIUS, THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST: THE ONLY CLEAR
WINNER
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius374 is not
narrowly speaking a rational basis commerce power case, but the test
is the only clear winner in the case. The majority found that the
Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) 375 individual mandate, a provision
requiring that most persons have some form of health insurance, was
not within Congress’ commerce power because it regulated inactivity,
not activity. The Court claimed that in the history of the Commerce
Clause it had never allowed the regulation of inactivity, thus there was
no need to apply either the substantial effects test or the rational basis
test. With Chief Justice Roberts making a quick change of hand,
worthy of the most talented close-up magician, his opinion for the
majority concluded that the individual mandate fell within Congress’
taxing power. Given that the Court claimed in the history of the
commerce power cases it had never encountered the regulation of
inactivity, including the inability of Farmer Filburn to grow wheat
above a certain allotment, the case seems singularly unimportant both
in terms of the ACA and the Commerce Clause. The ACA, with the
exception of the abuse of spending power,376 was upheld, and since the
374
375

376

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
The ACA is commonly called “Obamacare” by both its supporters and its
distractors.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 675–76. Using its spending power to impose conditions,
the law required that states dramatically increase the number of indigent persons
eligible for Medicaid coverage subject to a state’s loss of all federal
contributions for covered state expenses, not just for the new coverage. The
Court said that “Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”
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Court in its history had never had to deal with the impact of inactivity
on commerce, whether the Court was wrong or right on that distinction
as to Congress’ commerce power seems of little notice.377
Despite the Court not applying either the substantial effects test or
the rational basis test, the case is instructive as to the rational basis
test. Only Chief Justice Roberts in announcing the opinion for the
Court, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in part, did not
mention the rational basis test. The Chief Justice recognized that
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce “extends to activities
that ‘have a substantial effect on interstate commerce’” 378 and also
“extends to activities that do so only when aggregated with similar

377

378

Id. at 581. The Court felt that the threat of loss as to high percentage of 20% of a
state’s overall budget was too coercive to be passed under Congress’ spending
power, “In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.” Id. The
Court may for the first time since South Dakota v. Dole also have breathed new
life into limits on Congress’ spending power, which may ultimately be viewed
as another winner. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (The Court found
unexceptional Congress’ use of its power to spend money for interstate
highways to require that all states adopt a twenty-one-year-old drinking limit).
Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 256 (“Whatever one thinks of the
decision on its merits, this is not a line Congress has needed to cross for over
two hundred years, which is reason enough to doubt it will have much
significance.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health
Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1331 (2013). Professor Barnett, listed as one of the attorneys in both Raich
and Sebelius on the side challenging federal power, “Had we not contested this
power grab, Congress’s regulatory powers would have been rendered limitless.
They are not.” Id. at 1333. In answer to his own question, Professor Barnett
posits, “Why did so many law professors miss the mark in predicting this
reasoning? Part of the explanation is, of course, that law professors largely exist
in an ideological bubble in which folks like me are either nonexistent or can be
dismissed as marginal because we are so few in number.” Id. at 1346. Despite
Professor Barnett’s celebratory dance in the end zone, the line between
inactivity and activity is surely as specious as the historical line between direct
and indirect impact on commerce. What should be important is that the
individual mandate impacted billions of dollars of economic costs in the health
field, not some indefensible line between activity and inactivity. As Chief
Justice Roberts seemed to concede, it is a line no economist would respect: “To
an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity;
both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction
between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the
Framers, who were ‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.”
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 549.
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activities of others.” 379 While the Chief Justice did not apply the
rational basis test, the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, on the judgment but
dissenting as to the commerce power holding, was as complete an
adoption of the rational basis test as is possible:
[W]e owe a large measure of respect to Congress when
it frames and enacts economic and social legislation.
(“[S]trong deference [is] accorded legislation in the
field of national economic policy.”) (“This [C]ourt will
certainly not substitute its judgment for that of
Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate
commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent.”) When appraising such legislation, we ask
only (1) whether Congress had a “rational basis” for
concluding that the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a
“reasonable connection between the regulatory means
selected and the asserted ends.” In answering these
questions, we presume the statute under review is
constitutional and may strike it down only on a “plain
showing” that Congress acted irrationally.380
Perhaps even more telling as to the ascendency of the rational basis
test, the dissent of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, conceded, though almost begrudgingly, that the rational
basis test was the correct test, except that it was inapplicable to
inactivity, “It is true enough that Congress needs only a ‘rational basis’
for concluding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. But it must be activity affecting commerce that is
regulated, and not merely the failure to engage in commerce.”381

379
380

381

Id.
Id. at 602–03 (citations omitted). The Court cited to the usual commerce power
suspects, Raich, McClung, and Heart of Atlanta Motel among others, but also to
Carolene Products, the seminal rational basis case Due Process Clause case.
Id. at 657–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
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XI. SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE—FIVE REASONS WHY THE
RATIONAL BASIS TEST IS THE WRONG TEST FOR THE
COMMERCE POWER
There are few arguments made against the rational basis test in
commerce power cases, even at the scholarly level.382 That failure is
somewhat ironic in view of the fact that the rational basis test
sometimes encounters criticism, even in the due process and equal
protection cases where it began.383 Still, one can see why the rational
basis test has perhaps fewer critics in the commerce power cases than
even in due process cases. The logic behind the low level of review in
the due process and equal protection cases is that economic matters do
not need judicial protection but should depend upon the political
382

383

See, e.g., Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 290. This article argues for
limits as to Congress’ most obvious power, the power to cross state lines, on the
grounds that the power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to ban
altogether, but the article barely mentions the rational basis test. Professor
Friedman and Ms. Lakier use the term rational basis only once. Id. at 297; see
also Mank, supra note 366, at 384 (Professor Mank, who exaggerates the
Court’s use of the test stated, “From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court applied
a very lenient rational basis standard for reviewing congressional legislation
under the Commerce Clause, and upheld in every case congressional regulation
of intrastate activities even if the activities had only indirect impacts on
interstate commerce.”). But see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1801
(2012) (They believe that even the rational basis test is too restrictive of
legislative actions, “To reject rational basis review is not to hold that the
government may pass irrational laws. Rather, it is to hold that laws passed by the
people’s representatives, according to the constitutional prescriptions for
enacting laws, are per se reasonable. Our protection against irrationality is
institutional and democratic, not theoretical and judicial. The Constitution does
not authorize courts to interfere with validly enacted laws that do not violate a
stated limit on the government.”).
See Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 898, 899 (2005) (“The purpose of this essay is to help
expose the rational basis test for the sham that it is and to show how application
of the test in actual litigation perverts our system of justice.”); see also Jeffrey
D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment,
45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (“The rational basis test as it currently
stands is too weak. By allowing any plausible reason for the legislation to
suffice, whether or not it was a true reason for the legislation, and by asking
only whether lawmakers could have thought that it was reasonably related to the
subject it purported to advance, the Court has essentially made
the rational basis test the equivalent to no test at all.”).
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processes to seek any needed legislative adjustments. Perhaps the most
widely quoted statement of this comes from Williamson v. Lee
Optical:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said in
Munn v. State of Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not
to the courts.’384
With a few significant exceptions, 385 the commerce power cases
involve only economic issues while due process and equal protection
rational basis cases often involve some of the most important practical
and personal concerns in one’s daily life.386
There are at least five reasons why the rational basis test is the
wrong test for determining Congress’ commerce power. First, the
overwhelming weight of precedents supports the substantial effects
test as the correct test. The substantial effects test has carried the day
in history.387 Even in the cases that also apply the rational basis test,
384

385

386

387

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)
(citations omitted).
The racism in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach and the gender violence in
Morrison are exceptions from the normal economic issues, although the
economic aspects of both cannot be discounted.
These include housing, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); support for
needy children, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); protection from
disproportionate racial impact, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
medical coverage for indigent women for everything from pregnancies,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), abortions, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980); decisions as to life and death, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997);
job security, Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); and
equality of education, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
Based upon a Westlaw search, there are almost 150 Supreme Court cases,
including every Commerce Clause case mentioned in this Article decided after
1937, and over 1,500 federal cases that cite to Jones & Laughlin Steel. See, e.g.,
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576 (1942) (“The
commerce power is plenary, [Footnote 5—Jones & Laughlin Steel] may deal
with activities in connection with production for commerce and as said in the
Darby case, may extend to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate

2019

The Commerce Clause

277

the substantial effects test is included as part of the test. The
substantial effects test had its full reveal in 1937 in Jones & Laughlin
Steel (“a close and substantial relation”388), but even during the several
decades prior to 1937 when the Court had pretty much lost its way in
terms of the Congress’ commerce power, a few cases used similar
language in finding the commerce power. The substantial effects test
was first used by the Court as early as 1911 in Southern Railway (“a
real or substantial relation or connection”389) and again in 1914 in The
Shreveport Rate Cases (“a close and substantial relation” 390 ) to
describe the connection required between intrastate railroads and
interstate railroads to justify regulation by the ICC.
The test in Jones & Laughlin Steel is even respectful of the origins
of the Affectation Doctrine in McCulloch in 1819. Jones & Laughlin
Steel said that intrastate activities could be regulated if they so
substantially affect interstate commerce “that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce.” Both “essential” 391 and
“appropriate” 392 are used as synonymous terms in McCulloch to

388
389
390
391

392

commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of
the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.” (internal
quotations omitted)). See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422
U.S.
271,
280
(1975)
(“Similarly,
the
Court’s
opinion
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., two years later, had emphasized that
congressional authority to regulate commerce was not limited to activities
actually ‘in commerce,’ but extended as well to conduct that substantially
affected interstate commerce.”). See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539
U.S. 52, 56–57 (2003) (“Nor is application of the FAA defeated because the
individual debt-restructuring transactions, taken alone, did not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Congress’ Commerce Clause power may be
exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate
commerce if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent
a general practice . . . subject to federal control. Only that general practice need
bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911).
The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) (“If reference be had to its
[the word necessary] use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved
authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.” (emphasis added)).
See id. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
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explain what “necessary and proper” meant in terms of expanding
Congress’ enumerated powers.
Second, the rational basis test has been used in only a handful of
Supreme Court commerce power cases starting with Heart of Atlanta
Motel and McClung in 1964, and, of the two, likely only in McClung
did it make a difference.393 It can hardly be doubted that the Court on
its own would have found that the racist denial of food and lodging to
interstate travelers substantially affected interstate commerce.394 There
was no need to add to the substantial effects test that the Court’s job
was only to find if Congress might rationally believe that such odious
treatment of racial minorities traveling in interstate commerce
substantially affected interstate commerce. The rational basis test puts
the Court a step removed from the operative test. Under the rational
basis test, the Court need only find that it is conceivable 395 that
Congress might have believed that commerce was substantially
affected, not that it actually was. Instead of the Court actually deciding
in a practical kind of way if local activity affected interstate
commerce, under the rational basis test the Court only looks to see if
Congress might have conceivably believed there was such an effect. In

393

394

395

that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” (emphasis added)).
It is also unlikely that the rational basis test was needed in Hodel to find that
strip mining substantial affected interstate commerce.
It seems a little churlish to point out that Ollie’s did not actually purchase any
goods in interstate commerce but that it only purchased goods from a supplier
that had purchased goods in interstate commerce.
See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). This case raised an
equal protection rational basis issue as to the exclusions of some commonly
owned buildings from FCC regulations. “The question before us is whether there
is any conceivable rational basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 309 (emphasis added). “In
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.” Id. at 313 (emphasis added). “[T]hose attacking the rationality of
the
legislative
classification
have
the
burden
‘to
negative
every conceivable basis which might support it,’ . . . . ‘[I]t is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged
distinction actually motivated the legislature.’” Id. at 315 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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Heart of Atlanta Motel, there was no need to take the task of finding a
substantial effect away from the Court to uphold the law.396
McClung is another story. It is far from obvious that the overt
racism by Ollie’s Barbeque, even as multiplied by the class impact
doctrine, actually impacted the amount of food shipped in interstate
commerce. Almost certainly, no interstate travelers were involved.397
Moving the Court one step away in the case of Ollie’s may have saved
that part of the law. And if it took the rational basis test to give
Congress the power to address the evils of racism in local restaurants,
then its use in modifying the substantial effects test is perhaps
justified. 398 McClung in this way was unlike Lopez and Morrison
where there was no need for federal remedies to address issues already
addressed for the most part at the state and local level. In McClung, if
there was no federal power, then there was no remedy at the state level
given the endemic regional racism of the time. One can applaud the
396

397

398

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964). The
Court first stated the issue in terms similar to Jones & Laughlin Steel before
later inserting the rational basis test, “In short, the determinative test of the
exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply
whether the activity sought to be regulated is ‘commerce which concerns more
States than one’ and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.”
And after discussion of the various barriers that blacks faced in traveling
interstate, it concluded, “Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof,
including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which
might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.” Id. at 258.
Only then did the Court mention the rational basis test. Id.
In the days before Yelp made all of us both more careful and more
adventurous—we are willing to go outside of the normal interstate choices if
enough stars are aligned—but that was not the case in the 1960’s. Then we
looked for proven mediocrity—thank you, McDonalds—and convenience. No
one was risking food poisoning on a long road trip.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964). As urged by Justice
Douglas, the Court could have taken a more direct route and upheld the civil
rights law as being within Congress’ power to protect due process and equal
protection rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
might even have held that interstate travelers were protected under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (“Our cases have firmly established that
the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily
rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as
governmental interference.”). The Court’s logic in Griffin was that Congress had
the inherent power to protect attributes of federal citizenship, including the right
to travel interstate, without any reference to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the state action limitations of Section 1.
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Court’s twisting the commerce power precedents to address the serious
evil of local racism, but the Court should have limited the rational
basis test to McClung alone. There was no reason to drag it out in any
other case, and certainly not in the Raich case.
The Court’s explanation for using the rational basis test in Heart of
Atlanta Motel and McClung is not even remotely persuasive. The
Court said that since Congress had made the per se finding that racism
by businesses serving interstate travelers and by businesses buying
goods in interstate commerce hurt interstate commerce, the Court’s job
was not to apply the substantial effects test, but only to see if Congress
had a rational basis for the per se finding of such an effect.399 Congress
had made such per se findings many times in the past dating back at
least as far back as 1941 in the Darby case, upholding the FLSA.400
And Darby itself pointed out that the FLSA was not the first such law
to do that. Still, Darby applied the substantial effects test of Jones &
Laughlin Steel.401 It nowhere suggested that some lesser test might be
appropriate just because Congress may have tried to preempt the
Court’s role with its per se finding. If anything, Congress’ universal
finding that all such cases impacted interstate commerce should have
required a higher level of review.402
399

400

401

402

McClung, 379 U.S. at 303–04. Only in McClung does the Court actually attempt
to defend—and that more a conclusion than a defense—the rationale for
applying the rational basis test, “But where we find that the legislators, in light
of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is
at an end.” Id.
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941). The Court acknowledges
that when sometimes Congress decides for itself that a particular activity will
affect interstate commerce that the Court will have to decide if it “is within the
reach of federal power.” Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 119. The Court in Darby not only cited to the Jones & Laughlin Steel’s
test, but it said the substantial effects test had even an older history, “But long
before the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act, this Court had many
times held that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to
the regulation through legislative action of activities intrastate which have
a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power
over it.” Id. at 119-20.
Compare Darby, 312 U.S. 100, with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
In Gitlow, the Court said that if the law made certain types of speech a crime,
the Court was not to apply the clear and present danger test to see if the law was
consistent with the First Amendment. The clear and present danger test, it said,
had “no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself
has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances
of a specified character.” Id. at 671. Compare Darby, 312 U.S. 100, with Dennis
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Third, the rational basis test and the substantial effects test are
incompatible. The key to the substantial effects test is that it requires a
practical evaluation 403 of the actual impact on interstate commerce,
including the class or aggregate impact of any similarly situated
entities. It is a well-balanced test with all the cards on the table.
Applied correctly, it gives Congress the power to address all issues
involving more than one state, and certainly all of those issues with
which the individual states are incompetent to handle.404 But it does
impose some limits. Congress cannot simply indulge its tendency to
pass any law that might enhance the visibility or stature of members of
Congress whether needed or not.405 The rational basis test, on the other
hand, imposes no limits. That is its appeal. In the due process and
equal protection cases, the test allows the Court to wipe its hands of

403

404

405

v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Court in Dennis said that of course
the Court in such a case had to apply the clear and present danger test: “[W]here
an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction
relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only
when the speech or publication created a ‘clear and present danger’ of
attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime . . . .” Id. at 505.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The case that seems to mark the Court’s definitive commitment to the practical
conception of the commerce power is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . .
.” (citations omitted)).
One of the virtues of the substantial effects test is its simplicity. The test was not
advanced historically by the attempt to artificially distinguish between direct and
indirect effects on interstate commerce any more than it is helped modernly by
distinctions between economic or noneconomic effects and certainly not by the
specious attempt to distinguish between activities and inactivities. If no
economist would accept the distinction, then why should we believe that the
“practical statesmen” that made up the framers of our constitution would have
countenanced such a distinction?
See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026–27
(1977). The legendary Judge Friendly said, “Considerably more troubling to me,
from the standpoint of policy and even from that of constitutionality, has been
what seems a knee-jerk tendency of Congress to seek to remedy any serious
abuse by invoking the commerce power as a basis for the expansion of the
federal criminal law into areas of scant federal concern.” E.g., United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995), as amended (Sept. 29, 1995). The statement
of Representative Jim Ramstad, then a Republican representative from
Minnesota, in support of a federal carjacking law, “People are outraged and
terrified by the heinous carjacking epidemic currently upon us. How can any
civilized nation tolerate the brutal killing of a mother dragged 2 miles to her
death, while desperately trying to reach for her infant child inside her
commandeered car? How can any civilized people tolerate such despicable,
outrageous criminal acts? They cannot and they will not.” Id. at 579 n.12.
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any responsibilities. Absent fundamental rights or suspect
classifications, the Court upholds another law as rational and does not
look back at the havoc it might have left in its wake. 406 Under the
Court’s combined rational basis and substantial effects test, the Court
accepts as conceivable that Congress may have applied a practical
evaluation whether it did or not.407

406

407

See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). How did the Court sleep at
night when it turned its back on hungry children in allowing the state with little
or no justification to cap aid to families with dependent children based upon the
number of kids, denying larger families a basic sustenance? See Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999). Compare this Court’s approach where it struck down on
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities grounds a California law that
gave new residents the much lower welfare aid for the first year of California
residency that they had received in their former state. To California’s assertion
that it did so out of fiscal motives to save 10.9 million dollars per year, the Court
answered, “An evenhanded, across-the-board reduction of about 72 cents per
month for every beneficiary would produce the same result.” Id. at 506. The
higher level of review of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, instead of the rational basis test, turned the Court from Scrooge to
King Solomon. See 1 Kings 3:16-28 (where Israeli King Solomon exposed the
false mother in a disputed child custody case by ordering that the baby be cut in
half).
In most cases the conflict between the substantial effects case and the rational
basis test would not have to come into play. The Court does not, but in most
cases, it could first determine if there was, in fact, a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. If there were, it could then conclude that Congress might
rationally believe that. Only in cases where there was in fact no substantial
effect would the Court have to turn to the rational basis test. See United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). This Court created a similar but less dramatic
conflict in its rule statement. There, Justice Ginsburg for the Court stated the test
for gender discrimination in alternative terms, either that such laws had to
substantially relate to some important governmental interest or have some
exceedingly persuasive jurisdiction. It is possible that both statements mean the
same thing, but it looks like Justice Ginsburg might have been nudging the test
for gender discrimination to something closer to the compelling state interest
test for racial discrimination. Still, other than adding a note of confusion, both
tests give a high level of protection against state-based gender discrimination.
See Justice Rehnquist’s mild complaint in his concurring opinion as to the
exceedingly persuasive justification test, “It is unfortunate that the Court thereby
introduces an element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate test.” Id. at 559
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). The conflict can largely be avoided by the Court
first determining if any gender classification did substantially advance some
important governmental interest. If it did not, as is likely in most cases, the
Court will never have to reach whether there is also some exceedingly
persuasive justification.
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Fourth, our federal courts should be reserved for preeminent
federal interests, not bogged down with the minutia of daily
governance that should be reserved for the state courts. Of course, it is
not just the federal courts, but also the whole of the federal justice
system from the FBI to the United States Marshal’s Office to the
federal penitentiaries that are preempted from their primary
responsibility of protecting the nation as a whole.408 There are many
examples. 409 Although not technically speaking a commerce power
case, Bond v. United States,410 a 2011 case, involved such an issue.
The dispute could not have been more local. Ms. Bond was happy for
her close friend’s pregnancy until she learned that the father was Ms.
Bond’s husband.411 Ms. Bond used her access to dangerous chemicals
at her local place of employment412 to try to harm her now not-so-close
408

409

410
411

412

As for one of the five respondents in Comstock, Marvin Vigil, the government’s
petition to certify him as a sexually dangerous person mentioned in no particular
order the following federal resources: (1) the United States District Court, (2)
appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist, (3) the Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney, (4) the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Certificate Review Panel, (5) the
U.S. Marshal, (6) the Federal Public Defender, (7) the Senior U.S. District
Judge, and (8) the Federal Courthouse in the (9) Terry Sanford Federal Building,
Raleigh, North Carolina. Certification of a Sexually Dangerous Person, United
States v. Vigil, No. 06157–051 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2006),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/324328/vigil-marvincertification.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JK4-U5UG]. As for the need for the federal
law in Comstock, the government in its Petition for Certiorari acknowledged,
“many of the criminal acts that sexually dangerous persons might be expected to
commit would violate state law” but claimed that federal law criminalized many
others. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Comstock, 2009 WL
907847, at *25 n.12 (2009).
E.g., Bishop, 66 F.3d at 571. The Third Circuit upheld on both rational basis and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce grounds a federal law-making
carjacking a federal crime. The Third Circuit said that the “issue is the power of
Congress to criminalize ‘carjacking’—the armed theft of an automobile from the
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.” Id. A better
question has been suggested, “[W]as there some pocket of local government in
this country that had fallen under some perverted Amish anti-car influence and
thus local car owners needed the federal government to step in and protect their
unhindered access to drive unmolested to Orlando, Florida?” See
McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 32.
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S.
211 (2011).
Other caustic chemicals were purchased on the Internet, so some interstate
commerce was involved.
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friend, by rubbing caustic chemicals on various objects that the
pregnant woman might touch. After several dozen attempts, Ms. Bond
finally inflicted on her victim a minor burn on her hand from
chemicals Ms. Bond had smeared on the victim’s front door.413 The
victim called the federal authorities. Ms. Bond was indicted by a
Philadelphia federal grand jury for possessing and using a chemical
weapon in violation of a federal law that had been passed to fulfill a
treaty obligation, 414 bringing Congress’ treaty power into play and
only indirectly its commerce power.415 Whatever the source of federal
power, it is hard to believe that this crime raised any issues not
adequately dealt with at the state level. If trying to harm someone with
a dangerous chemical is not a crime in the Keystone State, it is not the
happy place it claims to be. 416 Likely, nothing is going to curb the
desire of Congress to appear to be doing something, whether based in
reality or not, but at the very least, the substantial effects test’s more
limited view of the federal commerce power as compared with the
413
414

415

416

See Bond, 572 U.S. at 844.
See Bond, 581 F.3d at 132. Under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,
Congress was obligated to pass implementing legislation. The Supreme Court
reversed the Third Circuit’s decision that Ms. Bond did not have standing to
raise the Tenth Amendment enumerated powers issue. The Court said that
principles of federalism were intended to protect both state sovereignty and
individual rights, the latter through the diffusion of power between the federal
government and the states.
Id. The Court does not acknowledge that this use of the treaty power without
support of the commerce power raised again an issue the Court first discussed in
Missouri v. Holland. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Holland upheld
the federal Migratory Bird Act of 1918 based upon Congress’ treaty power, even
though the law might at the time have been outside the then scope of its
commerce power. A limiting view of Holland’s language as to treaty power can
be found in Reid v. Covert. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). A plurality
opinion by Justice Black in Reid said that laws passed pursuant to treaty powers
were, of course, limited by the other provisions in the Constitution. See
generally Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism
and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726 (1998).
See ‘Pennsylvania. Pursue Your Happiness:’ Officials Unveil New State Slogan,
NBC
PHILADELPHIA
(Mar.
9,
2016,
6:57
AM)
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/business/Pennsylvania-Pursue-YourHappiness-Officials-Unveil-New-State-Slogan-371406511.html
[http://perma.cc/66FY-MJRP]. Pennsylvania has reportedly changed her state
slogan to “Pennsylvania. Pursue Your Happiness,” a reference to its role as the
site for the signing of the U.S. Constitution, which is a bit less assertive than
“America Starts Here,” but not as maudlin as “You’ve Got a Friend in
Pennsylvania,” both earlier slogans of Pennsylvania. Id.
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rational basis test imposes a somewhat more significant institutional
barrier.
Fifth, the substantial effects test is more consistent with notions of
federalism than is the rational basis test. In the sentence immediately
following its statement of the “substantial effects” test, the Court in
Jones & Laughlin Steel raised the federalism issue:
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be
considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government. The question is
necessarily one of degree.417
What level of federal commerce power is more consistent with
protecting the vibrancy of state power is a matter of degree. The
rational basis test as a source of federal commerce power is several
degrees off.
Much has been written about our system of federalism, and at the
Supreme Court level, perhaps none more so than by Justice
Kennedy.418 His first significant effort was in his concurring opinion
with Justice O’Connor in Lopez where he described four distinctive
aspects of our constitution:
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution,
separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial
review, and federalism, only concerning the last does
there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the
existence, and the content, of standards that allow the

417

418

N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (citations
omitted).
This Article does not attempt to define the merits of our federalist system, but
Justice Kennedy does it well. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568–83
(1995). See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999) (Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court that under the Eleventh Amendment Congress
could not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States as to monetary damages
using its commerce powers.); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220–24
(2011) (Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court holding that a person charged with
a federal crime can raise the Tenth Amendment federalism issue.).
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Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the
design contemplated by the Framers.419
Only “our role,” he said of the Court, “in preserving the federal
balance” seemed “tenuous.”420 And that is exactly the problem with
the rational basis test in the Commerce Clause cases. It removes to a
significant degree the Court from the job of deciding a crucial element
as to federal power vis-à-vis the states. It is my opinion that under the
substantial effects test, the Court is to decide this element of
federalism. Under the rational basis test, it seems to me, the Court’s
job is to rubber stamp it if Congress’ own determination of its role in
our federalist system is at all conceivable. I would say that not only is
Congress incapable of limiting itself to matters needing national
attention, it is unfair to ask it to monitor itself. Congress gets no credit
for what it does not do. Yet, the country is so polarized that it is hard
to address real issues like the looming bankruptcy of our public
pension system. Thus, Congress almost for survival has to appear to be
doing something, even if that something is already being adequately
handled at the state and local level.
There is something very telling about the Line Item Veto Act that
Congress passed in 1994. 421 Under that Act, Congress gave the
President the power to veto line items related to certain spending and
tax deductions.422 No one was forcing Congress to spend money or to
give tax deductions, but it seemed to recognize that it could not control
itself. Like the first of some kind of economic twelve-step program,
Congress acknowledged that it had a spending problem, and it needed
the President’s help.423 Congress can be no more trusted with defining
its own power in our federalist system than it can be trusted to be
fiscally responsible. It needs the help of the Court to keep its powers in
419
420
421

422
423

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575.
Id.
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). The Court found
the Line Item Veto unconstitutional, “Thus, because we conclude that the Act’s
cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, we find it
unnecessary to consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act
‘impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of
government.’” Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 447. The Court in Clinton recognized the potential merits, “Many
members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and
the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures
for the purpose of ‘ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington.’” Id.
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check. Admittedly, the substantial effects test may be more like the
illusion of a check, but the rational basis test is not even that.
XII. CONCLUSION—LIMITS ON COMMERCE POWER MATTERS
This Article has the audacity to claim that a somewhat stricter limit
on Congress’ commerce power would be more compatible with
constitutional norms of federalism. Even if that claim is supportable as
this Article tries to do, does it make a difference when all is said and
done? What Congress cannot do using its other enumerated powers,
including its commerce power, it can accomplish using its spending
power. As others have said, Congress’ spending power makes it the
900-pound gorilla.424 Congress is virtually unlimited in its ability to
encourage state and local bodies to undertake federal objectives.
Nonetheless, Congress cannot use its spending power as a source of
direct legislative power, and oftentimes Congress needs to do that.425
Limits on commerce power matter. They go to weightier matters of the
waste of federal resources and respect for states to find their own way.
In terms of California v. Raich, would the substantial effects test have
made a difference? The estimate—and the rational basis test required
no more than that—was that there were 100,000 users of state-grown
marijuana. Surely some of that unregulated marijuana would have
made its way into the interstate market, but would the class impact of
that illegally diverted marijuana have been a substantial impact? Or
framed in another way, was there a sufficient impact on interstate
commerce for Congress to preempt California’s different calculus as to
the permissible use of that ubiquitous substance? I think not. Whatever
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425

It was my pleasure many years ago to co-teach a course in constitutional history
at Pepperdine University School of Law with Justice Scalia, and he was forever
reminding the class that Congress’ control over the purse was “the 900-pound
gorilla.” Every class he made us laugh, and he challenged us to move beyond
our preconceptions. He will be missed.
Spending power alone does not always work. E.g., Robert Pear, Medicaid
Expansion Finds Grass-Roots Support in Conservative Utah, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
9,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/us/politics/utah-medicaidexpansion.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage
[http://perma.cc/TFW5-P5E4]. Only thirty or so states have taken advantage of
the additional federal spending available for the expansion of Medicaid under
the ACA despite the fact that the federal purse pays for at least 90% of the cost
of newly eligible beneficiaries. Id.
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the test the Court applies, it must always be applied with respect for
what is truly national versus what is local.

